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'J.j.

MORRISON" AND HIS RIGHT OF PUBLICITY LAWSUIT
AGAINST THE NCAA
Student-athletes shall be amateurs . .. motivated primarily by
education ... [and] should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.'
By SEAN HANLON AND RAY YASSER

I.

2

INTRODUCTION

College sports are big business. The concomitant demand for
college sports merchandise has not gone unnoticed by the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), the NCAA member insti-3
tutions, licensees of those institutions, or black market enterprises.
Today's market for licensed collegiate merchandise is nearly three
billion dollars per year. 4 Revenue derived from licensed collegiate
1. NCAA, 2006-07 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 2.9, at 5 (2006), available at
006
6
-07_
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_i_manual/200 -07/2
dlmanual.pdf [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL].
2. Sean Hanlon received a basketball scholarship to Northwestern University.
He graduated from the University of Tulsa College of Law in 2006 with the Highest
Honors. After clerking for Magistrate Judge Sam Joyner in the Northern District
of Oklahoma, he joined the law firm of GableGotwals in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Mr.
Hanlon is currently with the law firm of Holland & Hart in Denver, Colorado.
Ray Yasser is a Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. He
has published extensively in the field of sports law and is a co-author of one of the
nation's most widely used sports law casebooks. He was a "walk on" basketball
player at the University of Delaware in 1967 and 1968.
Neither Mr. Hanlon nor Professor Yasser can legitimately claim to having had
their names or likenesses commercially exploited by Northwestern University, the
University of Delaware or the NCAA. Both, however, would like to thank University of Tulsa Law Students Sarah Goss and Melissa Taylor for their assistance in
preparing this article. They also wish to thank faculty assistant Cyndee Jones for
her help in all facets of the production process.
3. See The Collegiate Licensing Company - Application Process, http://
www.clc.com/clcweb/publishing.nsf/Content/applicationprocess.html (last visited May 1, 2008) (noting existence of over 2,500 companies officially licensed by
The Collegiate Licensing Company to produce collegiate sports merchandise).
4. See The Collegiate Licensing Company - History, http://www.clc.com/
clcweb/publishing.nsf/Content/history.html (last visited May 1, 2008) (noting financial strength of collegiate licensing market); see also Vladimir P. Belo, Note, The
Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away With Violating the Right of Publicity, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133, 134 (1996) (discussing collegiate sports market).
The market was "250 million in 1984," "1 billion in 1989," and "reached 2.1 billion
in 1993." Id.
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merchandise generates substantial royalties for NCAA institutions. 5
It is no surprise that the most successful NCAA institutions also enjoy the largest share of the royalties generated by the sale of college
sports merchandise. During the 2005-2006 academic year, the University of Texas Longhorns - College Football's National Champion
- brought in a staggering $8.2 million in merchandising royalties,
shattering the previous NCAA institution's record for merchandis6
ing royalties by more than two million dollars.
In today's information age, technology has made the world a
much smaller place. Star NCAA players - particularly those participating in high profile Division I sports such as basketball and football - quickly gain national attention, notoriety, and stardom. 7 As a
result, college sports merchandise is not limited solely to the
schools and their athletic teams, but has expanded to capitalize on
the popularity of individual players. 8 Television stations recognize
the appeal of individual star players and incorporate this understanding into the commercials promoting the games. In order to
boost their ratings, for example, television stations frequently generate interest in college games by showing an image of the star
player's jersey from each team. Or, more blatantly, the television
stations will show some quick highlights of the star players with
commentary such as, "Tune in to watch the country's two leading
scorers - Gonzaga's Adam Morrison and Duke's J.J. Redick - go
head-to-head in an epic battle that cannot be missed!"
5. See, e.g., Husky Wear, LLC, About Our Products, http://
www.huskywear.com/help-answer.asp?ID=19#7 (last visited May 1, 2008) (stating
"Husky Wear, LLC is a licensee with UCONN and has been since 1994 . . . [and
w]hen you purchase a product on this website, a royalty is paid to The University of
Connecticut. Each item must be approved by both The Collegiate Licensing Company and The University of Connecticut.") (emphasis added).
6. See For the Record, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 4, 2006, at 34 (reporting Texas
passed previous merchandise record). The previous record for an NCAA institution's merchandising royalties was set by the University of Michigan during the
1993-94 academic year; however, the Texas Longhorns shattered that mark in the
2005-06 academic year, and have some cool toys to show for it. See id. For example, the Texas Longhorns' football stadium now boasts the "world's largest highdefinition video display," which measures 144.85 feet diagonally and is nicknamed
"Godzillatron." See id. (describing scoreboard at Texas' Royal-Memorial Stadium);
see also Carter Strickland, Georgia Ranks 4th in Royalty Revenue, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,
Aug. 27, 2006, at ElO (referring to Texas royalty record amount of $8.2 million).
7. See, e.g., Adam Morrison Has Reached Rock Star Status: Nation's LeadingScorer is
Popular Across the Nation, GOZAGS.COM (Official Site of Gonzaga University Bulldogs),Jan. 29, 2006, http://gozags.cstv.com/sports/m-baskbl/spec-rel/012906aaa.
html (commenting on popularity of Adam Morrison) [hereinafter Adam Morrison,

Rock Star Status].
8. See Belo, supra note 4, at 134 (suggesting schools are marketing individual
players for their own financial gain through, for example, replica jerseys featuring
star player's numbers).
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Certain types of collegiate sports merchandise are quickly becoming top-sellers for NCAA member institutions and their licensees, most notably authentic or replica jerseys featuring the star
players' jersey numbers and video games that quite accurately depict each individual athlete's physical appearance and athletic skill
in addition to the players' numbers. 9 Undoubtedly by design, most
of the jerseys made available for sale feature the uniform number of
the school's star player or players. Similarly, it is not surprising that
the physical attributes and athletic capabilities displayed in the
video games are remarkably accurate for star players. 10
Despite the amount of revenue that flows from a star player's
identity, the NCAA prohibits a student-athlete from reaping any of
the financial rewards under the guise of preserving amateurism. As
mentioned, the money generated from the identities of star players
certainly does not go uncollected, but rather fills the coffers of the
NCAA institutions. If student-athletes generating the lion's share of
this revenue are prohibited from receiving any of the proceeds,
someone has to take it, right? Why not the NCAA and its licensed
vendors?
Through its licensees, the NCAA exploits star players' identities for commercial gain without obtaining true consent from the
student-athlete, resulting in financial injuries year after year. This
practice is not appropriate - it is appropriation - and it is trampling
upon the student athlete's right of publicity. Yet, the NCAA asserts
that when a student-athlete signs his or her scholarship agreement,
that contract incorporates all of the NCAA rules and regulations by
reference, which provides the requisite consent. As this Comment
will show, however, this consent is not legally viable because the
athletic scholarship agreement is an unconscionable contract of
adhesion.
This Comment contends that an aggrieved student-athlete possesses a viable cause of action to assert in a lawsuit against the
NCAA, and offers the necessary counter-attack to defeat the
NCAA's main defense of consent. In Part II, the fictitious NCAA
9. See Andrew Carter, Virtual Payoff: Video Game Provides Added Revenue for
Schools, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 15, 2006, at Sports-1 (discussing profitability of

college sports games).
10. See EA Sports, March Madness 2006, Screenshots, http://www.easports.
com/marchmadness06/theater.jsp?media=screenshots (last visited Feb. 15, 2008)
(illustrating accurate depiction of virtual players based on physical attributes such
as height, weight, hairstyle, skin tone, facial hair, tattoos, and other identifying
characteristics such as head bands or wrist bands). Virtual players' athletic capabilities, such as speed and agility, are also represented. See id.
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basketball player 'JJ. Morrison" is introduced. 1 The hypothetical
facts associated with JJ. Morrison provide the backdrop for application of the prima facie case of appropriation. In order to gain some
familiarity with "big-time" intercollegiate athletics and the body governing its activities, Part III presents an overview of the NCAA, including

its purposes,

principles,

legislative

process, and

the

contradictory nature of its mission. 12 Part IV presents the basic law
13
of appropriation, and the emergence of one's right of publicity.
Part V reviews the current literature supporting the right of publicity extending to NCAA student-athletes and concludes with JJ. Morrison's prima facie right of publicity case against the NCAA and its
licensees. 14 Part VI discusses the NCAA's main defense - consent
to exploit arising out of athletic scholarship agreement - but demonstrates that the defense is unavailing because athletic scholarships are unconscionable contracts of adhesion. 15 Part VII provides
the final judgment, holding in favor of JJ. Morrison.

II.

J.J. MORRISON

Excitement is in the air. The energy inside the arena is contagious, and you cannot believe you are sitting courtside at such a big
game. The Gonzuke Bull Devils - currently rated number two in
the nation - are squaring off against the top rated team in the
country. The Bull Devils are fortunate to be playing this game at
home, in front of their loyal fans. From your seat, you can see Dick
Vitale gesticulating; a man possessed. Behind "Dickie V" a sea of
electrified undergraduates are clad in navy blue and red, with faces
painted to match. The students are randomly jumping around, so
that from across the gym floor the group appears to be a mass of
caffeinated jumping beans. The horns, drums, and other instruments from the school's band blast out Louie, Louie as the two teams
jog back to the sidelines after warming up for last minute strategy
11. For a further discussion of the background ofJ.J. Morrison, see infra notes
16-20 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the overview of the NCAA, see infra notes 33-91
and accompanying text. Parts III and VI of this article have been incorporated
from Sean Hanlon's previous publication, and have been modified and updated as
necessary to better fit within the contours of this Comment. See Sean M. Hanlon,
Athletic Scholarships as Unconscionable Contracts of Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?,
13 SPORTS LAW. J. 41 (2006).
13. For a further discussion of appropriation and the right of publicity, see
infra notes 92-162 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of J.J. Morrison's hypothetical right of publicity
case against the NCAA, see infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the argument why consent is an invalid defense
in this context, see infra notes 332-67 and accompanying text.
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sessions. After the Star Spangled Banner,the lights dim and the P.A.
announcer recites the starting lineups alternating between the two
teams. Last to be announced is the hometown favorite: "Starting at
shooting guard for YOUR Gonzuke Bull Devils, a 6'6" junior out of
Roanoke, Washington .

.

. NUMBER THREE ...

J.J. MORRRRR-

RISON!" The crowd erupts into a fevered pitch - and this is all
before the opening tip.
Meet JJ. Morrison, 16 the All-American and all-time leading
scorer for not only the Gonzuke Bull Devils, but for the entire conference as well. JJ. averages 28.6 points, 7.2 rebounds, and 4.7 assists per game, shooting 92.2% from the free-throw line, and an
astounding 50.8% from the field. His field goal accuracy is remarkable for a player who leads the NCAA in three-pointers made.
Amazingly, JJ. Morrison's scoring average is even higher when competing against teams ranked in the Top twenty-five. This star player
could write the book on the "sport's bedrock objectives: scoring
and winning." 17 His notoriety and stardom spans the entire nation,
reaching rock-star-status. 18
Due to JJ. Morrison's popularity, the sale of Gonzuke sports
merchandise has skyrocketed.' 9 Undoubtedly the overall success in
sales of all Gonzuke paraphernalia relates toJJ. Morrison's identity,
and the unique contribution of his athletic skill and gamesmanship.
Particular examples include: (1) Gonzuke merchandise sporting
the number three (particularly authentic basketball jerseys, but also
including t-shirts and other accessories), and (2) the 2007 version
20
of EA Sports' video game NCAA March Madness.
16. "J.J. Morrison" is a fictitious NCAA student-athlete based on actual facts
derived from both J.J. Redick of the 2005-06 Duke Blue Devils and Adam Morrison

of the 2005-06 Gonzaga Bulldogs. See Grant Wahl, Jewel of a Duel, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 6, 2006, at 62 (comparing athletic accomplishments of J.J. Redick
and Adam Morrison). Furthermore, all of the examples involving certain NCAA
licensees and the marketing of actual student-athletes are also based on actual
facts. For the purposes of this Comment, think of your favorite college basketball
or football player, and insert that student-athlete's name and facts in place of 'J.J.
Morrison."
17. Wahl, supra note 16, at 62 (discussing athletic prowess of Morrison).
18. See Adam Morrison, Rock Star Status, supra note 7 (showing Morrison's popularity among commentators, on ESPN and on Internet blogs).
19. See, e.g., Melodie Little, Zags In Fashion: Sales of GU Merchandise Take Off
Both at Campus Store and Online, SPOKESMAN REVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), Nov. 4, 2006,

at Al (quoting Dave Heinze, director of Gonzaga's campus stores, collegiate licensing and online sales) (Gonzaga University's "online sales have risen by roughly 400
percent" over the past five years). Heinze attributes "the growing interest in Zagswear to the success of the men's basketball team and interest in former forward
Adam Morrison." Id.
20. See Tim Surette, Morrison Chosen as Face of NCAA March Madness 07,
GAMESPOT NEWS, Oct. 30, 2006, http://www.gamespot.com/news/6160729.html
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Authentic Jerseys, T-shirts, and Other Accessories
Featuring #3

DuringJ.J. Morrison's stint as a Gonzuke basketball player, the
popularity of the Gonzuke basketball program flourished. Before
J.J. Morrison, the market for Gonzuke merchandise was basically
limited to local die-hards, current students, and alumni. Now, officially licensed vendors of Gonzuke sports merchandise entertain
daily orders from all over the country, and are flooded with orders
21
during the holiday season and the NCAA postseason tournament.
Some of the most popular items are the authentic Gonzuke basketball jerseys, t-shirts, and other accessories featuring the number
three. Although NCAA rules prohibit the appearance of J.J. Morrison's name on any of these items, some licensed vendors find subtle
- and sometimes not so subtle - ways of marketing the item by exploiting J.J. Morrison's identity for commercial gain without his
22
consent.
Consider the following examples. 23 One licensee of Gonzuke
has the following description on its website associated with a picture
of a Gonzuke basketball jersey number three:
This great new adult jersey from Colosseum features sewn
on letters and logos and the number of one of
[Gonzuke's] finest player[s] this year. NCAA rules prohibit the use of a player's name, but we all know who wears
24
this one!
Another vendor of Gonzuke University merchandise, even goes so
far as to include the words 'J.J. Morrison Jersey" above the online
(reporting EA Sports' NCAA March Madness 2007 was released on Microsoft's Xbox
360 and Sony's PlayStation 2 game platforms on January 16, 2007, and Adam Mor-

rison was chosen for cover of game).
21. See Little, supra note 19, at Al ("[Gonzaga University merchandise] is
made by about 100 manufacturers throughout the country that are approved by
the Collegiate Licensing Co. to manufacture and sell branded products. In return,
Gonzaga gets royalties. The popularity of our men's basketball team kind of put us
on the map around the country.").
22. These tactics are above and beyond the automatic association most sports
fans make - the identification of the star player with the college sports merchandise featuring that star player's number.
23. The examples are taken from actual practices, but, for the purposes of
this Comment, the text substitutes the school name "Gonzuke" and the player
name 'J.J. Morrison" and the number "three" in place of the actual school and
student-athletes.
24. Husky Wear, LLC -Jerseys, http://huskywear.com/jerseys.php (last visited
Nov. 10, 2006) (referring to then University of Connecticut player Rudy Gay). Although Rudy Gay is now playing in the NBA, this quote appeared on this website
during Rudy Gay's tenure as an NCAA student-athlete. See id.
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picture of a Gonzuke basketball jersey bearing the number three
and selling for the price of $70.00.25 Also listed next to the jersey is
the statement: "[s] upport your favorite [Gonzuke] basketball player
with this handsome replica jersey." 26 This description may connote
support of the student-athlete in a moral or emotional sense, but it
certainly does not provide any remuneration. Additionally, an
email sent to this particular vendor confirmed that "all of the
27
NCAA products [for sale by this vendor] are officially licensed."
An alumnus of Gonzuke University, and current director of
Gonzuke's campus stores, collegiate licensing and online sales "attributes the growing interest in [Zuke-wear] to the success of the
men's basketball team and the interest in [shooting guardJ.J. Morrison] .... Anything with the No. 3 on it we could sell. He [is] just
28
hugely popular."

B.

Video Game by EA Sports: NCAA March Madness

The popular video games created by Electronic Arts (EA)
Sports - such as NCAA March Madness 2006 - not only utilize the

specific jersey numbers associated with current individual NCAA
student-athletes, but have made full use of today's amazing graphics
to create realistic images. The game depicts stadiums, school
uniforms, mascots, and individual players with remarkable accuracy.
To promote, market, advertise, and sell the video game, EA Sports'
25. See Seattle Team Shop, Derek Raivio Gonzaga Jersey, http://www.seattle
teams.com/istar.asp?a=6&id=0001 1388X05R!NIKE&csurl=%2Fistar%2Easp%3Fa
%3D3%26dept%3DGONZ%26class%3DJERSEY%26 (last visited Nov. 10, 2006)
(marketing Gonzaga University basketball jersey with number five) [hereinafter
Raivio Jersey]. This licensed vendor included a caption - "Derek Raivio Jersey" above the image of the jersey for sale. See id. While this online picture and caption
was displayed, Derek Raivio was an NCAA student-athlete. See Gonzaga University
Men's Basketball - Player Bio: Derek Raivio, http://gozags.cstv.com/sports/mbaskbl/mtt/raivioderek00.html (last visited May 1, 2006) (listing Raivio as current player during relevant time). Raivio was a senior point guard for the 20062007 Gonzaga University Bulldogs, coming off of ajunior season where he started

31 of the 33 games for the Bulldogs. See id. Raivio's career free throw percentage
of 90.3 ranked first, at the time, in the NCAA, and after his junior season he was
ranked 7th in three pointers made, 10th in steals, and was only 17 assists shy of
being ranked 10th all-time among Gonzaga University Men's Basketball players.
See id.
26. See, e.g., Raivio Jersey, supra note 25 (suggesting site marketed apparel using Derek Raivio)
27. E-mail from Conor Glassey, e-Commerce Manager, JAS Sports Inc., to
Sean M. Hanlon, Law Student, University of Tulsa College of Law (Oct. 6, 2006,
14:50 CST) (on file with author) (confirming products on Seattle Team Shop's
website, particularly Gonzaga University replica jerseys, are officially licensed).
The representative from Seattle Team Shop stated: "Yes - all of the NCAA products that we sell are officially licensed." Id.
28. Little, supra note 19, at Al.
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television commercials and website prominently display images of
29
identifiable star players, including J.. Morrison.
The video game is officially licensed by the NCAA, and produces six-figure paydays for some NCAA institutions. 30 EA Sports,
which also makes college baseball and college football video games,
is the Collegiate Licensing Company's "single largest licensee." 3' At
some NCAA schools, these video games are proving to be "as profit32
able as any non-apparel item."

III.

AN

OVERVIEW OF

THE NCAA: ITS PURPOSES,

PRINCIPLES,

LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, & CONTRADICTORY MISSION

Today's NCAA 33 has expanded to include 1,281 voluntary
member institutions and their student-athletes. 3 4 The organization
is devoted to the sound administration of intercollegiate athletics. 3 5
The NCAA was formed with noble intentions and high ideals. 36
Since its inception in the early 1900s, the array of NCAA rules and

regulations have increased exponentially to the point where the
NCAA controls much of intercollegiate athletics. 3 7 The NCAA:
29. See EA Sports, March Madness 2006, Screenshots, supra note 10 (noting
resemblance of players in video game to actual NCAA basketball players).
30. See Carter, supranote 9, at Sports-1 (stating that NCAA Football 2006 "made
more than enough for EA to spread royalties among every school represented in
the game").
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Louis Hakim, The Student-Athlete vs. The Athlete Student: Has the Time
Arrived for an Extended-Term Scholarship Contract?, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 145, 153-55
(2000) (detailing President Theodore Roosevelt's involvement with birth of
NCAA); see also Sarah M. Konsky, Comment, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA
TransferRules, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1581, 1582 (2003); Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of IntercollegiateAthletics: Time for a New Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REx,. 487, 489
(1995); Rodney K. Smith, A BriefHistory of the National CollegiateAthletic Association's
Role in Regulating IntercollegiateAthletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 9, 12 (2000) (discussing early history of NCAA).
34. See NCAA Membership Composition and Sport Sponsorship, http://
wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membershipsvcs/membership-breakdown.html
(last visited May 1, 2008) (tallying number of teams in three NCAA divisions).
35. See RAYYASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (Univ. Press of
America 1985) (identifying NCAA among institutions that govern amateur sports).
36. For example, the NCAA goals, purposes, and principles discussed in this
Comment are much truer to form when analyzing Division III athletics. These
noble standards, however, have been clouded at the Division I level where money
and big business have flourished and take precedence over the foundational purposes for which the NCAA was put into existence (namely, student-athlete welfare
and amateurism).
37. See generally Smith, supra note 33, at 10 (explaining how NCAA rules manual grew from 161 pages in 1970-71 to three volumes totaling over 1,000 pages in
1998-99). Today, the three manuals total 1,179 pages. See NCAA DvISION I MANUAL,

supra note 1 (containing 476 pages); NCAA, 2006-2007 NCAA

DIVISION

II
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regulates athletic competition among its members, sets
rules for eligibility to participate, establishes restrictions
and guidelines for recruitment of prospective student-athletes, conducts several dozen championship events in the
sports sanctioned by the association, enters into television
and promotional contracts relating to these championship
events, and enters into agreements to license the NCAA
name and logos. 38
The current structure of the NCAA functions like a large corporation. The NCAA operates through the Council, the Executive Committee, and the Board of Directors - formerly referred to as the
Presidents Commission.3 9 The Council - the NCAA's ruling body consists of "a president, secretary-treasurer, and forty-[nine] institutional representatives who set general policy and oversee the various committees." 40 The Executive Committee is comprised of
twenty members, and "oversees the organizational bureaucracy and
ongoing business."'4 ' The Board of Directors has eighteen members and generally oversees the NCAA, conducts studies of intercollegiate athletics issues with the purpose of gaining knowledge to
42
urge certain courses of action, and proposes legislation.
The NCAA also has a Committee on Infractions serving as its
enforcement arm. 43 This Committee on Infractions hears cases,

oversees investigations about potential rule violations, and levies
MANUAL (2006), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_
ii_manual/2006-07/2006-O7_d2_manual.pdf (containing 372 pages); NCAA, 20062007 NCAA DIvISION III MANUAL (2006), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/
membership/division iiimanual/2006-07/2006-07_d3 manual.pdf (containing
331 pages).
38. YASSER ET AL., supra note 35, at 2-3.
39. See Ray Yasser, A Comprehensive Blueprintfor the Reform of IntercollegiateAthletics, 3 Marq. Sports L.J. 123, 125 (1993) [hereinafter, Yasser, Blueprint] (describing
NCAA administrative structure); see also NCAA DIvIsiON I MANUAL, supra note 1,
art. 4.2.1, at 21 (reporting on makeup of Board of Directors). The Board of Directors includes eighteen members and is comprised of presidents or chancellors. See
id.
40. NCAA DIviSION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 4.5.1, at 24 ("Management
Council shall include 49 members.").
41. Konsky, supra note 33, at 1582 (providing overview of NCAA); see also
NCAA DivSION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 4.1.14.1.2, at 21 (defining role of
Executive Committee).
42. See NCAA DIvisioN I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 4.1-4.5, at 21-28 (describing Board of Directors role).
43. See Konsky, supranote 33, at 1582 (explaining NCAA Council's structure);
see also Yasser, Blueprint, supra note 39, at 128 (noting NCAA has own Infractions
Committee).
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penalties. 4 4 Institutions under fire may appeal the rulings by the
Committee on Infractions. The NCAA Council may hear any ap45
peal as the final stage of the enforcement process.
The NCAA is divided into three divisions: Division I, Division
II, and Division 111.46 A variety of factors determine the division to
which a member institution belongs. These factors include the
number of sports offered at the institution, and whether and to
what extent athletic scholarships are available. 4 7 This Comment
will focus on Division I sports and will solely utilize the 2006-2007
NCAA Division I Manual.
A.

NCAA Purposes and Goals

The fundamental policy of the NCAA is:
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a vital part of the educationalsystem. A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the
student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarca48
tion between intercollegiateathletics and professional sports.
Thus, the NCAA declares that the organizational pillars are: educa49
tion and amateurism.
In addition to serving the goals of education and amateurism,
the NCAA further outlines nine purposes that the NCAA and its
members should strive to achieve. 50 Of the nine purposes listed,
44. See Konsky, supra note 33, at 1582; see alsoYasser, Blueprint, supra note 39,
at 128-29 (defining duties of Infractions Committee).
45. See Yasser, Blueprint, supra note 39, at 129 (explaining appeals process).
46. See Ray Yasser & Clay Fees, Attacking the NCAA 's Anti-Transfer Rules as Covenants Not to Compete, 15 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 221, 223 (2005) (acknowledging
three divisions of schools belonging to NCAA). NCAA Division I Football further
delineates into Division I-A and Division I-AA. See id.
47. See id. (listing factors NCAA considers when classifying school within particular division).
48. NCAA DVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 1.3.1, at 1 (emphasis added).
49. See Yasser, Blueprint, supra note 39, at 126 (analyzing some of NCAA's inherent problems). Professor Yasser argues that the NCAA's contradictory goals of
preserving amateurism in athletics while making as much money as possible for
member schools leads to an intercollegiate sports structure that is seriously flawed
and requires reform. See id.
50. See NCAA DwvIsION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 1.2, at 1 (identifying purposes of NCAA). At NCAA Division I Manual details at the ouset:
The purposes of this Association are:
To initiate, stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for
student-athletes and to promote and develop educational leadership,
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one is particularly noteworthy in the context of this Comment.
NCAA Article 1.2(c) provides that one of the purposes of the NCAA
is "[t]o encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply
with satisfactory standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and
5
amateurism." 1
B.

NCAA Principles

There are sixteen principles listed under Article 2 of the NCAA
Constitution. 52 For the purpose of this Comment, the principles of
53
primary importance include: (1) the student-athlete's well-being,
(2) amateurism, 54 and (3) governing eligibility. 55 Other interre-

physical fitness, athletics excellence and athletics participation as a recreational pursuit;
To uphold the principle of institutional control of, and responsibility for,
all intercollegiate sports in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of
this Association;
To encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and amateurism;
To formulate, copyright and publish rules of play governing intercollegiate athletics;
To preserve intercollegiate athletics records;
To supervise the conduct of, and to establish eligibility standards for, regional and national athletics events under the auspices of this
Association;
To cooperate with other amateur athletics organizations in promoting
and conducting national and international athletics events;
To legislate, through bylaws or by resolutions of a Convention, upon any
subject of general concern to the members related to the administration
of intercollegiate athletics; and
To study in general all phases of competitive intercollegiate athletics and
establish standards whereby the colleges and universities of the United
States can maintain their athletics programs on a high level.
Id.
51. Id. art. 1.2(c), at 1 (listing one purpose of NCAA).
52. See generally id. art. 2, at 3-5 (requiring legislation enacted by NCAA to
further at least one of sixteen enumerated principles).
53. See id. art. 2.2, at 3 ("The Principle of Student-Athlete Well-Being").
54. See id. art. 2.9, at 5 ("The Principle of Amateurism").
55. See id. art. 2.12, at 5 ("Eligibility requirements shall be designed to assure
proper emphasis on educational objectives, to promote competitive equity among
institutions, and to prevent exploitation of student-athletes.") (emphasis added).
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lated principles include the principle of institutional control and
57
responsibility, 56 and the principle of competitive equity.
C.

The Byzantine NCAA Legislation Process

The NCAA legislation process is more complicated than the
process by which bills become laws in the United States Congress. 58
NCAA proposals for legislation (legislative ideas, equivalent to bills)
can be proposed by an NCAA Conference legislative recommendation, the NCAA Management Council or Board of Directors, an
NCAA Cabinet or Committee, an NCAA member, or simply a referral to the NCAA from any source. 59 Next, the proposal goes to the
Management Council for formal initial consideration. 60 If approved, the Management Council must notify all of the NCAA
56. See id. art. 2.1, at 3 (outilining "Principle of Institutional Control and Responsibility"). The Principle of Institutional Control and Responsibility reads as
follows:
2.1.1 Responsibility for Control. It is the responsibility of each member
institution to control its intercollegiate athletics program in compliance
with the rules and regulations of the Association. The institution's president or chancellor is responsible for the administration of all aspects of
the athletics program, including approval of the budget and audit of all
expenditures.
2.1.2 Scope of Responsibility. The institution's responsibility for the conduct of its intercollegiate athletics program includes responsibility for the
actions of its staff members and for the actions of any other individual or
organization engaged in activities promoting the athletics interest of the
institution.
Id.
57. See id. art. 2.10, at 5 ("The structure and programs of the Association and
the activities of its members shall promote opportunity for equity in competition to
assure that individual student-athletes and institutions will not be prevented unfairly from achieving the benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate
athletics.").
58. See Project Vote Smart - Government 101: How a Bill Becomes a Law,
http://www.vote-smart.org/resource-govtl0l-02.php (last visited May 1, 2008)
(describing process through which U.S. bill becomes law). For a bill to become a
law, either the Senate or the House of Representatives must first introduce it as an
idea for legislation. See id. The bill is then discussed in Committee Hearings
before it goes on to Floor Action in the house in which the bill was first introduced. See id. If passed in that house, it goes to the other house for Committee
Hearings and Floor Action. See id. If the bill is then passed in the second house, it
goes to the State Governor or President (bills under consideration to become state
laws would go to the Governor of that particular state, while bills under consideration to become federal laws would go to the President of the United States) to be
accepted or vetoed. See id. Once the President or Governor signs a bill or both
houses override a veto, the bill becomes a law. See id.
59. See generally NCAA DMSION I MANUAL,supra note 1, art. 5, at 31-46 (identifying first step in NCAA legislative process); see also id. art. 5.3.2.2.1, at 36 (explaining approval process); id. figs. 5.1-5.2, at 44-45 (displaying NCAA legislative process
in charts).
60. See id. art. 5.3.2.4.1, at 38 (explaining step in NCAA legislative process).
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member institutions of the proposal. 6' That notification triggers a

sixty-day comment period during which the members can give input to the Management Council. 62 After the sixty-day comment period expires, the Management Council reconvenes for a second
63
consideration of the proposal, taking into account any comments.
If the second consideration is approved without significant modifi-

cation, 64 the proposal goes to the Board of Directors for consideration. 6 5 If approved without significant modification, 66 the Board of
Directors must notify the members, triggering a sixty-day period in
which members disagreeing with the approved proposal can request membership override. 67 If there is a request for an override

vote, and the override board attains at least a five-eighths majority
vote, then the proposal is denied. 68 But, if there is either no call for
an override vote, or if the override board does not attain a fiveeighths majority vote, then the Board of Directors' action is final
69
and the proposal becomes NCAA legislation.
In addition to the general NCAA legislative process, it is important to discuss the basis of NCAA legislation, 70 the approaches to
the legislative process, 71 and the different categories of legislation
61. See id. art. 5.3.2.4.2, at 38 (explaining step in NCAA legislative process).
62. See id. (explaining step in NCAA legislative process).
63. See id. art. 5.3.2.2.1, at 36. (explaining step in NCAA legislative process).
64. See id. art. 5.3.2.2.2.1, at 36 (explaining effect of type of modification on
proposed legislation). The NCAA rule for altering a proposal states:
If the Management Council alters a proposal after its initial approval but
does not increase the modification of existing legislation beyond that of
its initial proposal, it may proceed to take action to forward the proposal
to the Board of Directors. If the alteration increases the modification
beyond that initially approved, the Management Council shall forward
the altered proposal to the Division I membership for review and comment before taking final action.
Id.
65. See id. (explaining step in NCAA legislative process).
66. See id. (explaining step in NCAA legislative process).
67. Id. art. 5.3.2.3, at 37 (explaining membership override). The NCAA procedural rule for a membership override states:
The member institutions may override (e.g., rescind) the adoption of legislation enacted under the procedures set forth in Constitution 5.3.2.2.2
or the failure of the Board of Directors, or of the Management Council in
legislative areas delegated to it by the Board in accordance with Constitution 5.3.2.2.1.2 to act on or adopt legislation initiated and considered
through the legislative process. (Adopted 1/9/96, effective 8/1/97)
Id.
68. See id. art. 5.3.2.3.3, at 37 (explaining step in NCAA legislative process).
69. See id. art. 5.3.2.2.2, at 36 (explaining step in NCAA legislative process).
70. See id. art. 5.01.1, at 31 (outlining basis of legislation).
71. See id. art. 5.01.2, at 31 (identifying approaches to legislation).
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involved. 72 The basis for NCAA legislation is to ensure that it is
"consistent with the purposes and fundamental policy set forth in
Constitution 1,73 and shall be designed to advance one or more princi74
ples such as those set forth in Constitution 2."
The NCAA has two approaches with respect to its legislative
process. 75 First, the NCAA "recognizes that certain fundamental
policies, practices and principles have applicability to all members. '7 6 Second, the NCAA realizes that some legislation will only
be applicable to "division groupings of members, based on a common philosophy shared among the individual members of the division and . . . are common to the nature and purposes of the
'77

institutions in the division.
As a result of the recognized approaches, NCAA legislation is
divided into four categories: 78 (1) dominant, (2) division dominant, (3) common, and (4) federated.7 9 "A dominant provision is
one that applies to all [NCAA members] and is of sufficient importance to the entire membership ...."80 A division dominant provision only "applies to members of a certain division and is of
sufficient importance to that division."8' 1 A common provision applies "to more than one of the divisions of the [NCAA.] "82 Finally,
"a federated provision is a regulation adopted by a majority vote of
the delegates present and voting of one or more of the divisions or
subdivisions of the Association . . . [and] applies only to the divi-

sion(s) or subdivision(s) that adopt(s) it."83
The NCAA Constitution's fundamental policies, purposes, and
principles are dominant provisions applying to all NCAA mem72. Id. art. 5.02.1, at 31 (defining categories of legislation).
73. Id. art. 1.3.1, at 1.
74. Id. art. 5.01.1, at 31 (emphasis added).
75. Id. art. 5.0.1.2, at 31 (recognizing duel approaches to legislation).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. art. 5.02.1, at 31 (listing four categories of legislation).
79. See id. (noting that each category is identified in NCAA Manual by different symbol). A dominant provision is identified by an asterisk (*), a division dominant provision is identified by a diamond (0), a common provision is identified by
the pound sign (#), and a federated provision is identified by the Roman numeral(s) of the division(s) or subdivision(s) to which the provision is applicable.
See id.
80. Id. art. 5.02.1.1, at 31 (defining dominant legislation).
81. Id. art. 5.02.1.1.1, at 31 (defining division dominant legislation).
82. Id. art. 5.02.1.2, at 31 (defining common legislation).
83. Id. art. 5.02.1.3, at 31 (defining federated legislation).

2008]

STUDENT-ATHLETES AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLIcrry

255

bers. 84 The NCAA Bylaws governing amateurism, analyzed in this
Comment, are common provisions, applying to NCAA Division I, II,
and III sports.
D.

NCAA's Contradictory Mission

Over the years, the NCAA has been subject to criticism regarding the contradictory nature of its mission.8 5 The NCAA purports
to preserve the ideals of amateurism and student-athlete welfare on
one hand, while trying to make as much money as possible for its
member schools on the other hand. Consequently, the principle of
student-athlete welfare has eroded over time, blurring the principle
of amateurism along with it.86 Over the course of the NCAA's existence, big-time intercollegiate athletics has grown into a multi-billion dollar industry and NCAA member institutions and their
licensees strive to cash in on the loot.8 7 The NCAA's principle of

amateurism states that "student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises";8 8 however, the NCAA not only allows this exploitation to occur by its
licensees, but also actively participates in the exploitation through
its own member institutions, all the while collecting a steady flow of
royalties. Therefore, as the great fortune of big-time intercollegiate
athletics flourishes, the principle of student-athlete welfare erodes,
the principle of amateurism blurs, and the lofty mission of the
NCAA is contradicted.8 9 Mario Puzo was correct when he began his
classic novel, The Godfather, with, "Behind every great fortune there

84. See generally id. art. 1, at 1 (showing Article One is dominant provision); see
also id. art. 2, at 3-5 (showing Article Three is dominant provision).
85. See Yasser, Blueprint, supranote 39, at 155-56 (providing conflict of interest
argument involving NCAA).
86. See Kevin B. Blackistone, As Colleges Go Big-Time, Scholarships Lose Worth,
DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Apr. 4 1998, at 1B (reporting one college basketball coach

motivated players by threatening to take away their scholarships if they did not
perform at certain levels).
87. See id. (noting schools' preoccupation with winning and financial benefits
associated with winning may result in harm to students' welfare).
88. NCAA DMqsiON I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 2.9, at 5 (identifying NCAA's
principle of amateurism).
89. See e.g., id. arts. 2.2, 2.9, at 3, 5 (identifying student-athlete welfare and
amateurism as NCAA principles).
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is a crime." 90 The time has come to reform the structure of bigtime intercollegiate athletics as governed by the NCAA.9 1
IV.

LAW OF APPROPRIATION

& THE

"RIGHT OF PUBLICITYV"

The "right to privacy" - or the invasion of privacy - is "largely a

twentieth-century concept." 92 It is reputed to have begun with the
famous phrase, "the right to be let alone," which appeared in a late
19th century torts treatise written by Judge Cooley of the Michigan
Supreme Court. 93 Judge Cooley's treatise "analyzed a series of
nineteenth-century court decisions on defamation, trespass upon a
personal property right (such as lectures or publications), and
breach of confidence under implied contract law." 94 When viewed
in the aggregate, Judge Cooley deduced that these decisions were
95
striving to protect the broader "right to be let alone."
Amazingly, the law of appropriation as we know it today
emerged from two highly influential law review articles. Taken together, these law review articles molded and clarified the courts'
understanding and acceptance of the principles contained in the
law of privacy, ultimately creating four "invasion of privacy" torts.
Appropriation is one of these torts. In order to understand the
evolution of the law of appropriation, an introduction to these important articles is necessary.
A. Warren and Brandeis: The Right to Privacy
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote a now famous law review article that expounded upon Judge Cooley's "right

to be let alone" concept. 96 Warren and Brandeis were the first to
90. MAmo Puzo, THE GODFATHER Title Page (Putnam 1969). Puzo begins his
classic novel with this quote from Balzac. See id. As an interesting side note, The
Godfatherwas the favorite book of Walter Byers, the NCAA's first executive director.
See Don Yaeger, UNDUE PROCESS: THE NCAA's INJUSTICE FOR ALL 7 (Sagamore Pub.
1991) (acknowledging Byers' favorite book).
91. SeeYasser, Blueprint, supra note 39, at 123 (summarizing article). The article describes a comprehensive proposal to reform the current NCAA which offers
a working "blueprint for restructuring, not a call for demolition." Id. Professor
Yasser takes a hard look at the NCAA, piece by piece, and then proposes solutions
to make the reformed NCAA "something stronger and more beautiful." Id. His
solutions derive from the underlying goal of having college sports occupy a "more
appropriate role in the life of the university." Id.
92. WILLIAM R. BUCKLEY & CATHYJ. OKRENT, TORTS AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW
151 (3d ed. Thompson Delmar Learning 2004).
93. See id. (identifying roots of invasion of privacy tort).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890) (noting subject matter of article). Collaborators Warren and
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coin the phrase "right to privacy" and argued for it to be legally
recognized. 9 7 In fact, Warren and Brandeis' seminal law review article is "generally credited with significant influence in prompting
ultimate judicial acceptance of the [invasion of privacy] tort";9 8
however, the article "had little immediate effect upon the law." 9 9 In
1902, for instance, the Court of Appeals of New York - in a 4-3
decision - rejected Warren and Brandeis' support of a right of privacy and declared that the right of privacy did not exist. 0 0 The
Court's reasoning for rejecting the right of privacy included "lack
of precedent, the purely mental character of the injury, [and] the
'vast amount of litigation' that might be expected to ensue."'1 1 Interestingly, the Court's decision resulted in so much public disapproval that (1) a concurring judge "[took] the unprecedented step
of publishing a law review article in defense of the decision," and
(2) the "next New York Legislature enacted a statute making it both
a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the name, portrait or
picture of any person 'for advertising purposes or for the purposes
10 2
of trade' without his written consent."'
For the next three decades, the courts were in continual disagreement over whether a right to privacy existed.10 3 After this period of indecisiveness, a strong majority of jurisdictions began to
recognize the right to privacy, while the remaining courts still re10 4
jecting such a view began to be overturned.
Brandeis graduated first and second in their class from Harvard Law School in
1877. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 384 (1960) (explaining
background of co-authors). See also BUCKLEY & OKRENT, supranote 92, at 151 (suggesting Warren and Brandeis article expanded on Judge Cooley's original concept
of "right to be let alone").
97. See Claire E. Gorman, Note, Publicity and Privacy Rights: Evening Out the
PlayingField for Celebrities and Private Citizens in the Modern Game of Mass Media, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 1247, 1252 (2004) (tracing genesis of right to privacy tort to Warren and Brandeis article); see also BUCKLEY & OKRENT, supra note 92, at 151 (naming co-authors of The Right to Privacy article as first to articulate term).
98.

JOHN

L.

DIAMOND,

LAWRENCE C.

LEVINE, & M.

STUART MADDEN,

UNDER-

451 (2d ed. Lexis 2000). The law review article written by Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis is "regarded as the outstanding example of the
influence of legal periodicals upon the American law"' Prosser, supra note 96, at
383.
99. Prosser, supra note 96, at 384.
100. See id. at 385 (referring to Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y.
538 (1902) (rejecting right to privacy concept)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (referring to Denis O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 Colum. L. Rev. 437
(1902)).
103. See id. at 386 (noting lack of consensus among states over whether tort
STANDING TORTS

existed).

104. See id. (providing list of states that recognized right of privacy as of 1960).
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Dean William L. Prosser: Privacy

By 1960 there were over 300 cases dealing with the law of privacy; however, most cases dealt with "whether the right of privacy
existed at all." 10 5 At this point in time, the law of privacy was often

described as "a haystack in a hurricane." 10 6 Seeking to advance the
law surrounding the right of privacy, Dean William L. Prosser wrote
a law review article to specifically articulate what interests the right
to privacy protects, and against what conduct this protection is necessary. 10 7 Dean Prosser theorized that within the law of privacy
there exist "four distinct kinds of invasions of four different interests of the plaintiff."'1 8 The only commonality existing among the
newly identified invasion of privacy torts was "that each represents
an interference with the right of the plaintiff.

.

. 'to be let

alone."'1 09 The invasion of privacy torts were described as:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about
the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness.110
The fourth invasion of privacy tort identified by Prosser involves the "exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff's identity." '1 '
The tort arises when the defendant appropriates the plaintiffs
name or likeness, without consent, resulting in a benefit or advantage for the defendant."12 In a footnote, Dean Prosser remarked
that "[i] t is not impossible that there might be appropriation of the
plaintiff's identity... without the use of either his name or likeness,
and that this would be an invasion of his right of privacy."' 1 3 At the
105. Id. at 388 (suggesting early cases were concerned with issue of whether
tort existed).
106. Id. at 407 (categorizing privacy law during 1960s as scattered).
107. See id. at 388 (summarizing purpose of article). William Prosser served as
Dean of the College of Law at UC Berkeley. See id. at 383 n.* (noting professional
position of Dean Prosser).
108. Id. at 389 (articulating different categories of invasions).
109. Id. at 389.
110. Id. (identifying four types of invasions).
111. Id. at 401.
112. See id. at 401-02 (defining tort of appropriation).
113. Id. at 401 n.155.
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14
time of Dean Prosser's article, however, no such cases had arisen.
For Prosser, the central feature running through this privacy tort
involves the symbol of the plaintiff's identity. Appropriation does
not occur unless the symbol of the plaintiff's identity is pirated for
15
the defendant's advantage without the plaintiffs consent.

The courts' determination of appropriation turns on a two-step
analysis. First, the courts must determine "whether there has been
appropriation of an aspect of the plaintiff's identity."' 16 This could
include any symbol - such as a fictitious stage name - so long as it

"can be so identified with the plaintiff that he is entitled to protection against its use."'1 7 Second, the courts must determine
"whether the defendant has appropriated the name or likeness for
his own advantage."' 18 Prosser notes that while the statutes have
limited the defendant's advantage strictly to pecuniary advantage,
the common law has not been so restrictive - finding appropriation
to exist, for example, when the defendant posed as plaintiffs common law wife.1 19 In most cases, however, the commercial element
must be present for appropriation to exist.
Appropriation differs drastically from the other three privacy
torts listed by Prosser in terms of the interest being protected.120
For the privacy torts of intrusion, public disclosure of private facts,
21
and false light in the public eye, the interest is largely mental.
Appropriation, on the other hand, involves a proprietary interest in
the "exclusive use of the plaintiffs name or likeness as an aspect of
his identity."' 2 2 This proprietary interest exists as "a right of value
123
upon which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses."
Dean Prosser's article was so influential that his four-tort
model of the legal right of privacy was adopted in the Restatement
114. See id. (admitting case involving these circumstances had not arisen at
time article was written).
115. See id. at 403 ("It is the plaintiff's name as a symbol of his identity that is
involved here, and not his name as a mere name.") (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 404 (expanding protection to include fictitious or stage names associated with person).
118. Id. at 405 (discussing "for his own advantage" requirement).
119. See id. at 405 n.180 (providing examples of non-pecuniary advantages).
120. See id. at 406 (contrasting appropriation with other three categories of
invasions).
121. See id. (identifying protected interest in three other categories of
invasions).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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(Second) of Torts.124 With respect to appropriation, section 652C
provides: "[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the
name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy."1 25 It is clear from the hundreds of case
citations utilizing Prosser's model that the four invasions of privacy
torts are well established in American jurisprudence.
C.

Emergence of the "Right of Publicity" & Its Embodiment in
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition

While it became clear that Dean Prosser's four-tort model designed to protect various privacy interests from certain identified
conduct - enjoys judicial acceptance, it is less clear how commercial
injuries under the appropriation tort fall under an invasion of one's
privacy. This confusion becomes even more apparent when dealing
with celebrities or other individuals whose identity carries some
form of notoriety or fame. Some of the early decisions dealing with
this question "preclud[ed] celebrities from invoking a right of privacy to prevent unauthorized commercial use of their names or
likenesses." 126 In O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., a famous college football
player's photograph was included in a calendar made by Pabst Co.
to advertise its beer. 127 The calendar included "complete schedules
of all major college games; professional schedules; and pictures of
Grantland Rice's 1938 All American Football Team."1 28 Davey
O'Brien was shown in his Texas Christian University ("TCU") football uniform poised to throw the ball. Also included on the calendar was the caption "Pabst Blue Ribbon, Football Calendar, 1939," a
photograph of a Pabst Blue Ribbon beer glass, and a bottle of Pabst
129
Blue Ribbon.
O'Brien testified that he was a member of the Allied Youth of
America, an organization that discouraged young people from
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-I (1977) (listing Prosser's
four tort model); see also Gorman, supra note 97, at 1254 (adopting Dean Prosser's
four-tort model of privacy torts).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652C (1977) (illustrating definition
of appropriation tort in Restatement remains similar to definition in Prosser's
Privacy).
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, reporters notes,
cmt. b (1995) (citing O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941);
Pallas v. Crowley-Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d 595 334 (Mich. 1952)).
127. See 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1941) (summarizing subject of plaintiffs
suit).
128. Id. (describing calendar).
129. See id. (describing calendar).

2008]

STUDENT-ATHLETES AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

261

drinking alcohol.' 0 O'Brien claimed that using "his photograph as
part of defendant's advertising was an invasion of his right of privacy and that he had been damaged thereby."' 3' The court denied
O'Brien's claim, reasoning that while this may have been actionable
for a private person, O'Brien's nationwide celebrity status as a football player made him a public person, and therefore no right to
32
privacy attached to the photograph used by Pabst Blue Ribbon.
O'Brien was not asked for consent by Pabst Blue Ribbon and, if
asked, he would have vehemently denied the request. But it is interesting to note that the court found that the director of the TCU
publicity department had given the necessary consent, and TCU re1 33
ceived payment for the use of the O'Brien photo.
The appropriation tort identified by Prosser and incorporated
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts includes harm to both personal
and commercial interests "caused by an unauthorized exploitation
of the plaintiffs identity.' u3 4 Despite this reality, O'Brien demonstrates the difficulty some courts had in extending relief to "wellknown personalities whose celebrity precluded the allegations of injury to solitude or personal feelings normally associated with an invasion of privacy."' 1 5 Therefore, fairness dictates that a separate
right to protect the pecuniary value of a celebrity's persona is
necessary.
In 1953, the common law right of publicity was born when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit became the
136
first to "formally distinguish the rights of publicity and privacy."
In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., a baseball
player had entered into a contract granting the plaintiff the "exclusive right to use the ball-player's photograph in connection with the
sales of plaintiff's gum."' 3 7 The baseball player further agreed not

to grant a similar right to any other gum manufacturer during the
130. See id. at 168-69 (citing O'Brien's reason for objecting to his inclusion on

calendar).
131. Id. at 168.
132. See id. at 169 (providing rationale for declining to find invasion of right
to privacy).
133. See id. at 169-70 (establishing that defendant paid T.C.U. director one
dollar for using photograph and assumed this meant defendant had necessary
consent).
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, cmt. b (1995) (noting harm is to both personal and commercial interests of plaintiff).
135. Id. (summarizing reason why courts were originally reluctant to accept
tort).
136. Id. § 46 reporters notes, cmt. b (citing first case to make distinction).
137. 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953) (providing terms of exclusive contract
between ball player and chewing gum company).
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term of the contract, which also granted the plaintiff an option to
extend the term for a designated period. 138 The defendant, a rival
chewing gum manufacturer with knowledge of the contract between the baseball player and the plaintiff, "deliberately induced
the ball-player to authorize defendant, by a contract with defendant, to use the player's photograph in connection with the sales of
defendant's gum either during the original or extended term of
plaintiffs contract.'1 9 After obtaining this authorization from the
baseball player, the defendant used the photograph to enhance the
sales of its gum.
During the lawsuit, defendants maintained their innocence
based on the theory that the contract between the plaintiff and the
baseball player was simply a release of the baseball player's personal
right to privacy. 140 Without this release the plaintiff, when using
the photograph for the plaintiffs advantage, would be liable for an
invasion of the baseball player's privacy. 14 1 From this argument,
the defendants concluded that since the plaintiffs contract vested
no property or other legal interest in the plaintiff, the defendants
had undertaken no actionable wrong. 142 In other words, the de-

fendants were claiming that the baseball player only held "a personal and non-assignable right not to have his feelings hurt by such
a publication." 14 3 The majority in Haelan rejected this defense, and
instead held:
[I] n addition to and independent of that right ofpivacy... a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph,
i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing
his picture .... This right might be called a "right ofpublicity." For it is common knowledge that many prominent
persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer
received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses [sic], trains and subways. This right of
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it
138. See id. (detailing terms of contract).
139. Id.
140. See id. (recounting defendant's argument).
141. See id. (recounting defendant's characterization of agreement between
ball-player and plaintiff).
142. See id. (summarizing defendant's legal argument).
143. Id. at 868.
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could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which
144
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.
The Haelan court thus recognized a right of publicity as distinctly
separate from the right of privacy, although an infringement upon
these two independent rights may arise out of the same appropria1 45
tive conduct.
Following Haelan, legal debate ensued, and currently courts
and state legislatures are still grappling with whether a "right of
publicity" should be recognized separately from the invasion of privacy tort of "appropriation." To demonstrate, many common law
rules today "view the right of publicity as an independent doctrine
distinct from the right of privacy," yet "other cases continue to protect the commercial value of a person's identity through the privacy
tort. ' 14 6 Thirteen states have codified a statutorily-based right of

publicity, but most are broad enough to "redress injuries to both
147
commercial and personal interests."

For those jurisdictions recognizing a cause of action for a right
of publicity separate from a cause of action for invasion of privacy,
the following general methodology is utilized.1 48 First, the court
will determine the nature of harm suffered by the plaintiff. If the
harm suffered by the plaintiff relates to personal interests, "such as
a person's well-being and the right to be free of negative public
discourse" then the plaintiff has a cause of action for invasion of
privacy.' 49 On the other hand, if commercial interests of the plaintiff are at stake, then the plaintiff has a cause of action for a viola1 50
tion of his or her right of publicity.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of
the Associative Value of Personality,39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1208 (1986) (tracing independent right of publicity stemming from Haelan). Shortly after Haelan, Professor
Nimmer wrote an influential article seeking to define this new right of publicity.
See id. at 1208-09 (citing Melville B.Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954) and explaining that Nimmer thought right of privacy and
existing models were inadequate to address new right in announced in Haelan).
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 reporters notes, cmt.
b (1995).
147. Id. (identifying conflicting views regarding whether fight of publicity and
right of privacy are independent rights or whether right to publicity is encompassed by right to privacy).
148. Because each state would have its own statutory and common law to specifically guide this issue, the general methodology proffered by this Comment
makes reference to the Restatements to define the theories of law.
149. Belo, supra note 4, at 137.
150. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. b (1995)
(illustrating that claim may arise under both theories if both personal and commercial harm have demonstrably resulted).
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Second, if the cause of action is for invasion of privacy, the
plaintiff must satisfy the elements for appropriation, as defined by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 652C.151 Otherwise, if the
cause of action is to protect one's right of publicity, the plaintiff
must satisfy the elements for appropriation, as defined by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition sections 46-47. If the plaintiff
proves the prima facie case in either or both instances, then the
defendant is either liable for the invasion of privacy which harmed
personal interests, or liable for violating the right of publicity which
harmed the plaintiffs commercial interests.
As previously mentioned, section 652C defines appropriation
as "[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy."' 1 2 The definition for appropriation under section
652C is silent with regard to consent. Section 652F, however, incorporates the absolute privileges to publish defamatory matter listed
under sections 583-592A as applying to the invasion of privacy tort
of appropriation. 153 Section 583 provides that if proper consent is
obtained, the defendant would not be liable for invasion of
privacy.154

By contrast, section 46 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines the right of publicity as a separate right, and recognizes the separate interest arising from appropriation that exploits
the commercial value of a person's identity. Section 46 provides:
"One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity
by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the
relief appropriate under the rules stated in sections 48 and 49."155

Consequently, the right of publicity definition differs in one crucial
respect from the definition of appropriation relating to the invasion of privacy. The latter limits the appropriation to name or likeness, while the former recognizes that appropriation of the
commercial value of a person's identity can include - in addition to

151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
quired for appropriation).

OFTORTS§

652C (1977) (listing elements re-

152. Id. (defining appropriation).
153. See id. § 652F (stating absolute privileges apply to invasion of privacy).
154. See id. § 583 (identifying consent as defense to invasion of privacy tort).
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
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name or likeness - "other indicia of identity for the purposes of
56
trade."1
Section 47 clarifies the meaning of "[u]se rflor [p]urposes
[o]f [t]rade" as follows:
The name, likeness, and other indicia of a person's identity are used 'for purposes of trade'. . . ifthey are used in
advertising the user's goods or services, or are placed on merchandise marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services rendered by the user. However, use 'for purposes of
trade' does not ordinarily include the use of a person's
identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment,
works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is inci157
dental to such uses.
The right of publicity's broadened definition allows the fact-finder
to determine whether the purported symbol of identity is "so closely
and uniquely associated with the identity of a particular individual
that [its] use enables the defendant to appropriate the commercial
158
value of the person's identity."'
Several other aspects arising out of the emergence of the right
of publicity are noteworthy. First, the right of publicity recognizes
that when another's identity is appropriated for purposes of trade,
the resulting injury can encompass both personal and commercial
interests. 59 Second, case law reflects the purpose of the right of
publicity as stemming from " It] he desire to secure for plaintiffs the
commercial value of their identity and to prevent the perceived unjust enrichment of an appropriator."' 160 Third, celebrities are "not
precluded from establishing cognizable injury to personal interests
in addition to commercial loss, nor are less well-known plaintiffs
precluded from establishing commercial loss in addition to injury
to personal interest, whether recoverable through a single or companion causes of action."' 16 1 Finally, when establishing liability
156. Compare RESTATEMENT

propriation), with RESTATEMENT
fining appropriation).

OF TORTS, § 652C (1977) (defining ap(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (de(SECOND)

157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995) (emphasis
added).
158. Id. § 46 cmt. d (instructing when use of other identifying characteristics
which are not person's name or likeness will infringe right of publicity).
159. See id. § 46 cmt. a (outlining scope of injury for appropriation).
160. Id. § 46 reporters note, cmt. c (outlining underlying policy of right of
publicity claim).
161. Id. § 46 cmt. b Some cases, however, have limited the right of publicity
to people able to demonstrate a certain level of fame or notoriety, and have lim-
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against the defendant, it need not be proven that the defendant
162
intended to identify the plaintiff.
V.

STUDENT-ATHLETES'

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

For over ten years, many writings have discussed how appropriation, particularly the right of publicity, applies in the NCAA student-athlete context. 163 Much of the literature points out the
inequity of the NCAA allowing its institutions and licensees to profit
from merchandise specifically designed to identify star athletes.
Two of the most blatant inequalities involve (1) authentic or replica
gamejerseys featuring the jersey numbers of star players, 164 and (2)
video games depicting collegiate athletes, particularly the college
basketball video game created each year by EA Sports titled: NCAA
March Madness. The NCAA exclusively controls the right to license

these products. Rather than "protecting" the student-athletes from
"exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises" - as described in the NCAA manual as one of its main principles - the
NCAA and its licensees engage in highly lucrative exploitation. The
NCAA not only allows this exploitation to occur by outside professional and commercial enterprises, but actively participates in exploiting the commercial value of star student-athletes' identities.
Under the guise of preserving amateurism, the NCAA disallow student-athletes from receiving any remuneration for the sale of prodited invasion of privacy claims under the theory of appropriation to non-celebrities. See id.
162. See id. § 46 cmt. e (1995) (noting that "a mistake regarding the plaintiff's
consent is not a defense").
163. See, e.g.,
Belo, supra note 4; Matthew G. Matzkin, Gettin' Played: How the
Video Game Industry Violates College Athletes' Rights of Publicity by Not Payingfor Their
Likenesses, 21 Lov. L.A. ENT.L. REV. 227 (2001); Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing:
A Simple Curefor the Exploitation of College Athletes, 18 Loy. L.A. ETr. LJ. 307 (1998);
Laura Freedman, Comment, Pay or Play? TheJeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Ama-

teurism Rules, 13

FoRDHAm

INTELL. PROP. MEDIA

&

ENT.

L.J. 673 (2003); David

Warta, Comment, PersonalFoul: Unnecessary Restriction of Endorsement and Employment
Opportunitiesfor NCAA Student-Athletes, 39 TULSA L. REv. 419 (2003); Kristine Mueller, No Control Over Their Rights of Publicity: College Athletes Left Sitting the Bench, 2
DEPAULJ. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 70 (2004); Rodney K. Smith & Robert D.
Walker, From Inequity to Opportunity: Keeping the Promises Made to Big-Time Intercollegiate Student-Athletes, 1 NEv. LJ. 160 (2001);James S. Thompson, Comment, University Trading Cards: Do College Athletes Enjoy a Common Law Right to Publicity?, 4 SETON
HALL J. SPORT. L. 143 (1994). This list of scholarly works is riot meant to be exhaustive, but rather to serve as a sampling of related pieces advocating that the
student-athletes' right of publicity is being infringed upon.
164. This area of infringement would also include t-shirts and other
accessories making use of a star player's number to boost sales.
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ucts that are so "closely and uniquely associated with the identity" of
165
each student-athlete.
A. Jerseys Featuring the Student-Athlete's Number
166
"Anything with the No. 3 on it we could sell."

Players labeled as P-T-P'ers (prime-time-players) by wacky college basketball commentator Dick Vitale are in danger of having
their identity commercially exploited. Authentic or replica jerseys
featuring the numbers of prime-time-players - in addition to t-shirts
and other accessories featuring a star player's number - are often
top sellers for the NCAA institutions and licensees.
A jersey number is very much a part of a star player's identity. 1 67 A star player's jersey number becomes inseparably linked to

the player. As images of star players are broadcast nationwide via
televised games, commercials, newspapers, magazines, and the Internet, it is the jersey number that is often associated with the
player's name.
Jersey numbers differentiate players. The greatest players are
occasionally honored by having their jersey number retired as "a
symbolic gesture" providing that no other player will ever wear a
particular number again. 16 8 This act memorializes the player's
identity with that specific team and jersey number. 1 69 There is no
doubt that placing a star player's number on a jersey for sale en170
hances its popularity, demand and, consequently, its value.
While it may be true that people purchase college sports merchandise simply because of the school or athletic team, it cannot be
overlooked that merchandise featuring star-players' jersey numbers
are best-selling items.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995).

166. Little, supra note 19, at Al (quoting Dave Heinze, director of Gonzaga's
campus stores, collegiate licensing and online sales and referring to popularity of
Adam Morrison, NCAA leading scorer for 2005-06 basketball season, who wore
number three for Gonzaga Bulldogs).
167. See Belo, supra note 4, at 145-48 (suggesting athlete's jersey constitutes
part of athlete's identity).
168. See id. at 145 (describing custom of retiring jersey number of certain
players).
169. See id. (illustrating that retiring certain numbers lends support to link
between athlete and jersey number).
170. Commercial enterprises pay millions of dollars for celebrities to endorse
their products, thus recognizing that individuals with a certain level of fame and
notoriety can have a dramatic effect on sales.
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A star player's jersey is inextricably linked to his or her identity.
The jersey number represents the player's name or likeness. Appropriation of one's name can include "a real name, nickname, or professional name," and one's likeness is usually embodied in a
"photograph, drawing, film, or physical look-alike."' 71 The NCAA
prohibits the use of a student-athlete's name to appear on licensed
jerseys, but regards the jersey number as not significantly linked to
1 72
the individual.
Fairness dictates, however, that the law should extend beyond
the arbitrary boundaries laid out by the NCAA in order to protect
against the commercial appropriation of a player's identity. In a
footnote of Dean Prosser's influential article that created four different causes of action under the invasion of privacy, he remarked,
"[i]t is not impossible that there might be appropriation of the
plaintiff's identity.., without the use of either his name or likeness,
and that would be an invasion of his right of privacy."' 73 Similarly,
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition has recognized the necessity of this extension, embodying the principle in section 46,
which, in addition to name or likeness also includes "other indicia
of identity."' 74 Furthermore, some commentators have identified
several cases finding a right of publicity in situations beyond the
traditional notions of name or likeness.' 75 To exemplify the reach
of this extension, a brief discussion of two particular cases is
warranted.
1.

Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.

A cause of action for a right of publicity claim is not limited to
the appropriation of one's name or likeness, but should extend to
other ways "whenever [one's] identity is intentionally appropriated
171.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 46 cmt. d (1995) (pro-

viding examples of how person's name or likeness can be appropriated).
172. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.5.2.1, at 78 (declining
to prohibit use of student-athlete's jersey number in advertisements and promotions); see also id. art. 12.5.1.1(h), at 75 (placing restrictions on using studcnt-athlete's "name, picture, or likeness," but not mentioning jersey number).
173. Prosser, supra note 96, at 401 n.155 (suggesting person's identity should
be given expansive definition).
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).

175. See, e.g.,
Belo, supra note 4, at 139-44 (providing examples of cases which
have taken more expansive view of person's identity); Matzkin, supra note 163, at
230-31 (providing examples of cases which have taken more expansive view of person's identity).
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for commercial purposes. ' 176 In Carson, the former host of The Tonight Show - Johnny Carson - brought suit against a "corporation
177
engaged in renting and selling 'Here's Johnny' portable toilets."

Carson claimed that his right of publicity was violated by the defen-

dant corporation's unauthorized use of his famous monologue cue,
"Here's Johnny," which was "generally associated with Carson by a
substantial segment of the television viewing public."'1 78 Dismissing
Carson's complaint, the trial court held that the right of publicity
"extend[s] only to a 'name or likeness,' and 'Here's Johnny' did
not qualify."'

79

The appellate court, however, did not agree, and found the

180
trial court's conception of the right of publicity to be too narrow.

The appellate court held that the right of publicity must protect the
"pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his iden18 1
tity."'
It was clear to the court that "[i]f the celebrity's identity is
commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of his right
whether or not his 'name or likeness' is used."' 18 2 Citing to other

court decisions sharing this line of reasoning,1 83 as well as to the
persuasive authority of Prosser's idea that "[ilt is the plaintiff's
name as a symbol of his identity that is involved here, and not as a
mere name," 8 4 the appellate court concluded that Carson was entitled to judgment because the defendant had appropriated the com185
mercial value of Carson's identity without consent.
176. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th
Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (showing past courts have taken more expansive view
of person's identity in right of publicity cases).
177. Id. at 833 (noting owner of corporation combined "Here's Johnny"
phrase with "The World's Foremost Commodian" to achieve "a good play on a
phrase").
178. Id. at 832-33.
179. Id. at 833 (recounting district court's decision).
180. See id. at 835 (disagreeing with district court regarding scope of identity
in right of publicity claim).
181. Id. at 834.
182. Id. at 835.
183. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974) (altering, slightly, features on famous race-car for cigarette television commercial); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (using drawing of
Muhammad Ali with phrase, "The Greatest"); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (using football running back's nickname, "Crazylegs"
to market woman's moisturizing shaving gel). These cases all recognized the right
of publicity extending to various symbols of one's identity, absent of one's name or
likeness.
184. Prosser, supra note 96, at 403.
185. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 836 (finding use of phrase "Here's Johnny" was
appropriation of plaintiffs identity).
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Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

A celebrity may have a pecuniary interest in a tangible symbol
so closely identified with the celebrity's identity that an appropriation of that symbol will make a right of publicity claim actionable. 18 6 This right of publicity persists even if the celebrity's name is
not used, and even if the likeness of the celebrity is unrecognizable
to some. 18 7 In Motschenbacher, an internationally known racecar
driver brought suit against the defendants for using his racecar in a
television commercial for cigarettes.1 88 Motschenbacher's racecars
were unique and readily identified as his own. His racecars contained "a distinctive narrow white pinstripe appearing on no other
car."'18 9 His cars were all solid red, and he used a white oval as the
background for his racing number "11" - as opposed to the "circular backgrounds of all other cars."' 190 In the commercial, the defendants used a photograph of Motschenbacher's car without his
consent, but altered the photograph by changing the racing number to "71" and adding a spoiler to the car with the name of their
product.' 9 1 Despite changing the number and adding a spoiler, the
other characteristics of the car - unique to Motschenbacher - re-

mained. The court held that the "distinctive decorations appearing
on the car.., caused some persons to think the car in question was
plaintiffs .... ,,192 In essence, the distinctive and recognizable nature of the car had commercial value that was affixed to the identity
of Motschenbacher. The right of publicity did not allow the defendants in this case to be unjustly enriched by appropriating this
193
commercial value without Motschenbacher's consent.
These cases demonstrate that it is possible for something other
than one's name or likeness to have commercial value. The law will
protect against commercial exploitation and unjust enrichment. A
star player's jersey is inextricably linked to his fame and thus the
commercial value attaches to his identity. Therefore, the law's pro186. See Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 825 (including symbol as part of person's
identity).
187. See id. at 827 (expanding definition of identity beyond previous rigid
name or likeness definition).
188. See id. at 822 (recounting facts of case).
189. Id. (identifying how plaintiff "individualized" his cars).
190. Id. (providing another example of how plaintiff differentiated his car
from other race-cars).
191. See id. at 822 (identifying differences between plaintiffs car and car depicted in defendant's advertisement).
192. Id. at 827 (finding, despite defendant's alterations, people identified car
in advertisements as plaintiff's car).
193. See id. (stating holding of case).
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tection should extend further than name and likeness in the NCAA
context. The NCAA and its licensed institutions should not be

shielded from the law by the sly maneuver that prohibits the use of
a star player's name on a numbered jersey.
B.

Video Games

The student-athlete's right of publicity claim in connection
with video games is an easier application of the tort. Not only are
their virtual jerseys utilized in the video games, but the likenesses of
current student-athletes are also included with remarkable accuracy. Electronic Arts (EA) Sports has three different video games

involving NCAA athletics: NCAA March Madness, NCAA Football, and
NCAA Baseball.19 4 The video games come out with new versions
each year containing updated and improved graphics and
95
features. 1
NCAA Football 2007 alone is "expected to produce millions for
EA Sports and six-figure paydays for some institutions whose football teams are traditionally strong."'19 6 With advanced gaming consoles, the "games are loaded with rich graphic detail. 1 97 Although
the NCAA does not permit player's names to be used in the game,
these virtual NCAA student-athletes sport their uniform numbers
and are otherwise accurately depicted based on physical attributes
such as height, weight, hairstyle, skin tone, facial hair, tattoos, and
other identifying characteristics such as head bands or wrist
bands. 198 Also, the virtual players' athletic capabilities, such as
speed and agility, are represented. 199
Unlike the obligations EA Sports faces when making video
games involving professional sports - "in which the players are
identifiable by name and must be compensated accordingly," there is no such obligation to pay the student-athletes for the use of
194. See Electronic Arts, http://www.easports.com (last visited May 1, 2008)

(listing video games manufactured by company).
195. See Carter Strickland, The Best Video Game; NCAA Football; Is it Better Than
the Real Thing?, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Aug. 27, 2006, at Q10 (reporting NCAA Football 2007 has new feature called "campus legend mode" allowing gamer to "create
a freshman player and take him through all phases of college life - even selecting a
major").
196. Carter, supra note 9, at Sports-i ("NCAA Football 2006 generated more
than $79 million in revenues . . .up $65 million from the revenues produced by
the 2001 version of the game.").
197. Id.
198. See EA Sports, March Madness 2006, Screenshots, supranote 10 (illustrating detail of videogame's graphics through screenshots).
199. See Carter, supra note 9, at Sports-i (explaining video game copies individual, athletic traits of NCAA athletes).
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their likenesses and identity. 20 0 NCAA Bylaws prohibit student-athletes from taking any payment - other than tuition, room and
board - based on their athletic skill, including "compensation for
the use of their names and images." 20 1 Eric Fisher, a writer for the
Sports Business Journal, believes that these video games are yet "another way for the NCAA to profit off its athletes. ' 20 2 Fisher remarked that "[t] his is just another iteration of the whole conflict
that separates amateurism and big-time college sports. It's sort of
just a different flavor of the merchandising angle. Putting these
'20 3
guys in a video game is a new form of an old debate.
EA Sports has a well-known and well-publicized slogan: "It's in
the Game." 20 4 This slogan is derived from the idea that whatever is
contained in the real-life version of the sport is also included in EA
Sports' virtual creation of that sport. True to form, EA Sports has
not left out the reality that NCAA student-athletes' identities are
commercially exploited. If you play the video games you are participating in the exploitation - it's in the game.
Even without using the student athletes' names or photographic likenesses in the video games, the law should protect the
identity of players from this type of exploitation. In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., the court held that an advertisement
using a robot constructed in the likeness of Vanna White - longtime hostess of "Wheel of Fortune," one of the most popular television game shows in history - was a violation of White's right of
publicity. 20 5 In White, the advertisement featured a "female-shaped
robot .

.

20 6
. wearing a long gown, blond wig, and large jewelry."

The robot was turning a block letter on "what looks to be the Wheel
of Fortune game show set."20 7 The court found that viewed as a
whole, the advertisement infringed upon Vanna White's exclusive
right to exploit the commercial value associated with her identity. 20 8 The court went on to say that "[c]onsiderable energy and
ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity value
to exploit it for profit... [and t] he law protects the celebrity's sole
200. See Matzkin, supranote 163, at 228 (contrasting compensation for professional athletes versus student-athletes for inclusion in videogames).
201. Id. (restricting types of permissible compensation for student-athletes).
202. Carter, supra note 9, at Sports-1.
203. Id.
204. Electronic Arts, supra note 194.
205. See 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding district court erred in
rejecting White's right of publicity claim).
206. Id. (describing features of female-shaped robot).
207. Id. (describing background of advertisement).
208. See id. (comparing defendant's robot in advertisement to Vanna White).
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right to exploit this value whether the celebrity has achieved her
fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination thereof."20 9
The White court also posed a hypothetical that relates to this
Comment:
Consider a hypothetical advertisement which depicts a
mechanical robot with male features, an African-American
complexion, and a bald head. The robot is wearing black
hightop Air Jordan basketball sneakers, and a red basketball uniform with black trim, baggy shorts, and the number
23 (though not revealing "Bulls" or 'Jordan" lettering).
The ad depicts the robot dunking a basketball onehanded, stiff-armed, legs extended like open scissors, and
tongue hanging out. Now envision that this ad is run on
television during professional basketball games. Considered individually, the robot's physical attributes, its dress,
and its stance tell us little. Taken together, they lead to
the only conclusion that any sports viewer who has registered a discernible pulse in the past five years would reach:
2
the ad is about Michael Jordan. 10
This hypothetical is analogous to the video games featuring NCAA
student-athletes. Like the Jordan hypothetical, the names of the
student-athletes are not included in the video games, but this is the
only aspect of the student-athletes that is not represented. The depiction of the virtual student-athletes - particularly the high-profile
athletes whose video game images are largely unmistakable - satisfies even the strictest interpretation of whether an infringement of
one's right of publicity has occurred. Under the strict interpreta-

tion one must appropriate the name or likeness of the individual.
In these video games, there is no doubt that the student-athletes'
likenesses are being appropriated for the commercial value that
goes along with their identities. Under any reading of White, this
conclusion is underscored.
Whether it is the sale or marketing of authentic jerseys featuring the numbers of star-players, or the video games created by EA
Sports, NCAA student-athletes are exploited for the commercial
value associated with their identities. The NCAA's practice of not
using student-athlete names (on jerseys, accessories, and in video
games) does not mask the identity of the player. The NCAA's spurious practice of prohibiting the names of current student-athletes to
209. Id.
210. Id. (emphasis added).
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be included with these products provides no protection against actionable claims for the violation of student-athletes' right of
publicity.
C. JJ. Morrison's Prima Facie Case
Based on the discussion above, JJ. Morrison has an actionable
right of publicity claim against the NCAA and its licensees for the
appropriation of the commercial value of his identity. In order to
put on a prima facie case, JJ. Morrison must prove 5 basic elements: (1) the NCAA's and its licensees' (the defendants') use of
the plaintiff's identity, (2) his identity has commercial value, (3)
the defendants have appropriated that commercial value for purposes of trade, (4) lack of consent, and (5) resulting commercial
2 11
injury.
First, J.J. Morrison's identity is contained in any Gonzuke
sports merchandise featuring the number three. This includes basketball jerseys, t-shirts, and other accessories. As discussed, J.J.'s
contribution of basketball skill and athletic prowess to the Gonzuke
merchandise featuring the number three is closely and uniquely associated with J.J.'s identity. J.J.'s identity, and even likeness, is also
contained in EA Sports' NCAA March Madness video game. The

video game's characterization of JJ. is amazingly accurate, and his
virtual image is prominently displayed while advertising the video
game. Consumers know that the game depicts JJ.
A Gonzuke employee in charge of the school's merchandise
sales stated, "[alnything with the No. 3 on it we could sell. UJ.
Morrison is] just hugely popular."2 12 Another licensee - in a
description next to the online picture of a Gonzuke #3 basketball
jersey - uses the caption, "NCAA rules prohibit the use of a player's
name, but we all know who wears this one!"213 Yet even another
official licensee included the caption 'JJ. Morrison Jersey" above
the picture of a Gonzuke #3 basketball jersey in connection with an
online sales website. There is no doubt that the NCAA and its licensees are using the identity of JJ. Morrison.
Second, JJ. Morrison's identity has commercial value. An ordinary sandwich - half-eaten by Britney Spears - sold on EBay for
211. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995) (listing elements of right of publicity case).
212. Little, supra note 19, at Al.
213. Husky Wear, LLC -Jerseys, supra note 24.
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over $500.214 JJ. Morrison's star persona amid a yearly multi-billion
dollar demand for college sports merchandise indicates that his
commercial value is more than substantial.
Third, the defendants have appropriated JJ.'s commercial
value for purposes of trade. His identity is used for purposes of
trade when it is "used in advertising the user's goods . . . or ...
placed on merchandise marketed by the user."2 15 EA Sports has
used his identity in advertising its video game, and the NCAA and
its licensees - including EA Sports - have placed his jersey number,
and thus his identity, on college sports merchandise. Without a
right of publicity, the commercial value of his identity will continue
to be exploited, unjustly enriching the appropriators. Both the law
and policy favor the protection of the commercial value of one's
identity based on the principle that people should be able to reap
what they sow.
Fourth, J.J. Morrison has not consented to his identity being
exploited. This is the element of J.J.'s prima facie case that will
receive the most contention. The NCAA and its licensees will argue
that at the moment one agrees to become a student-athlete, the
athlete agrees to be bound by all of the NCAA's rules and regulations. 2 16 The NCAA Manual clearly states that "[o]nly an amateur
student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation
in a particular sport. '2 17 The rules further provide that the studentathlete will lose amateur status upon accepting remuneration in
connection with the advertisement, promotion, and sale of commercial products.2 1 8 JJ.'s counterattack is that this consent to allowing the commercial exploitation of his identity is invalid because
it was not freely given, and the scholarship contract agreement is an
unconscionable contract of adhesion. This argument is discussed
219
thoroughly in Part VI of this Comment.
214. See The Buzz, Rociv MTN. NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Sept. 12, 2006, at 6D
(reporting on online auction which garnered $520 for half-eaten sandwich by
Britney Spears).
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995) (outlining
purposes of trade" requirement).
216. For a further discussion of the documents that form the athletic scholarship and the incorporation of the NCAA regulations into these documents, see
infra notes 273-80 and accompanying text.
217. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.01.1, at 65 (emphasis
added) (restricting eligibility to amateur athletes).
218. See id. art. 12.5.2.1, at 78 (identifying student athlete can loses amateur
status by accepting remuneration).
219. For a further discussion arguing that a scholarship contract is a contract
of adhesion, see infra notes 333-67 and accompanying text.
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Fifth, the appropriation of JJ. Morrison's identity tramples
upon his "right of publicity," resulting in commercial injury. One
of the NCAA's main principles is that "[s] tudent-athletes ...should
be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises." 220 Yet rather than forbidding the exploitation, the
NCAA actively participates in the exploitation. The NCAA and
other appropriators receive a windfall at the expense of the studentathletes. This unjust enrichment causes commercial injury to J.J.
Morrison. Clearly, the NCAA and its licensees are exploiting JJ.
Morrison's identity as a nationally recognized star college athlete
without his true consent - thereby resulting in financial injury.
Upon a successful showing of all five elements, JJ. Morrison
will be entitled to either: (1) injunctive relief to prevent "a continuing or threatened appropriation of the commercial value of [JJ.
Morrison's] identity,"22 1 or (2) monetary relief in the amount of

Morrison's pecuniary loss, or in the defendants' gain, whichever
amount is greater. 22 2 Furthermore, if Morrison can demonstrate
that the defendants acted in "willful disregard of the plaintiffs
rights," Morrison may be entitled to punitive damages. 223 Reality
dictates that it is both unlikely, and undesirable, for the manufacture, promotion, sale and use of these products to be enjoined. It is
necessary, however, to compensate the student-athlete whose
unique contribution added value to these products.
While it is true that several star student-athletes go on to the
professional ranks and are richly compensated for their athletic
skill, the argument that star student-athletes' are unsympathetic
plaintiffs is unpersuasive. The vast majority of NCAA student-athletes do not make their way into the professional ranks. These athletes are cheated out of the commercial value of their identities at
the time when their identities have value. The NCAA rules should
not be allowed - in the name of preserving amateurism - to provide

NCAA institutions and their licensees with a free ticket to exploit
the commercial value of star student-athletes' identities.

220. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 2.9, at 5 (purporting to protect amateur athletes from exploitation).
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 48 (1995) (listing one
form of relief for right to publicity claim).
222. See id. § 49 (listing one form of relief for fight to publicity claim).
223. See id. (noting punitive damages are available in some circumstances).
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CONSENT DEFENSE FAILS - THE ATHLETIC

SCHOLARSHIP

IS

AN UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT
OF ADHESION

In Dean Prosser's famous law review article, Privacy, he recognized that "[c] hief among the available defenses is that of the plaintiff's consent to the invasion, which will bar his recovery as in the
case of any other tort."224 Undoubtedly, the NCAA's defense toJJ.

Morrison's right of publicity claim will be no different. The NCAA
will assert that JJ. Morrison waived his right of publicity while a
student-athlete, granting the NCAA exclusive rights to license and
control the merchandise utilizing JJ. Morrison's identity.2 2 5 According to the NCAA, this waiver of rights, as required under the
mandates of the NCAA rules, operates as consent. When a studentathlete enters into an athletic scholarship agreement, the contractual documents incorporate all of the NCAA rules and regulations
by reference. 226 The NCAA Division I Manual is a 46 7 -page document. We contend that this so-called consent is invalid because the
athletic scholarship contract is an unconscionable contract of
adhesion.
The elements of oppression, unfair surprise, and terms unreasonably favoring the NCAA member institution create an unconscionable contract of adhesion between the aggrieved studentathlete and the institution granting the athletic scholarship. Prior
to analyzing the doctrine of unconscionability and its relation to
athletic scholarships, a brief overview of modern-day contract law is
necessary. After an overview of contract law, this Comment will
demonstrate the courts' recognition of athletic scholarships as
contracts.
A.

The Law of Contracts: An Overview

"A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law
224. Prosser, supra note 96, at 419 (recognizing consent as chief defense).
225. See NCAA DivisIoN I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 31.6, at 430-32 (outlining

NCAA's exclusive rights to control goods and services featuring its marks). Article
31.6 of the NCAA Division I Manual states:
The NCAA shall maintain control over the nature and quality of the
goods and services rendered under the marks; therefore, no use of the
marks by others will be permitted in advertising, in association with commercial services or related to the sale of merchandise without the specific
approval of the NCAA.
Id.
226. For a further discussion on the incorporation of the NCAA rules in the
NLI and Financial Aid statement, see infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
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in some way recognizes as a duty."2 2 7 Therefore, the principal function of contract law is to provide a framework for the enforcement
of promises. 228 In most instances, a contract cannot be formed
without the presence of consideration, which is a bargained-for exchange or the suffering of a legal detriment. 2 29 There are some
situations, however, where a contract will be enforceable without
consideration when equitable principles so require. 2 30 As previously mentioned, the institution of sports reflects as well as shapes
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
228. See Timothy Davis, BalancingFreedom of Contract and Competing Values in
Sports, 38 S. TEX L. REv. 1115, 1118 (1997) (noting purpose of contract law is to
enforce promises).
229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) (stating that formation of contract requires bargain in which there is manifestation of mutual assent to exchange and consideration). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 71 (1981) states:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must
be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by
the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise.
(3) The performance may consist of
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.
(4) The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or
to some other person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other
person.
Id.; see also Michael J. Riella, Note, Leveling the PlayingField: Applying the Doctrines of
Unconscionability and Condition Precedent to Effectuate Student-Athlete Intent Under the
NationalLetter of Intent, 43 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 2181, 2188-2189 (2002) (reiterating
purpose of contract law).
230. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981) (providing rule
for "past consideration"). Section 86 of the Restatement describes:
(1) A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the
promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent
injustice.
(2) A promise is not binding under Subsection (1)
(a) if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons the
promisor has not been unjustly enriched; or
(b) to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the benefit.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (discussing contracts without consideration). Section 90 states:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under
Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action or
forbearance.
Id. See also Riella, supra note 229, at 2189 (recognizing equitable principles may
permit contract to exist without consideration).
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society's value system.23 ' Similarly, contract law, and the law in general, also reflect and certainly contribute to shaping our society's
2 32
culture and values.
Contract law has evolved from a classical model to a neoclassical model, a detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
Comment. 233 The classical model of contract law emerged in the
nineteenth century. It involved a freedom of contract ideology with
an emphasis on "individual autonomy and noninterference by the
state." 23 4 The judiciary's function was to "mechanically apply abstract formal rules in order to limit judicial intrusion into individual
autonomy." 23 5 Conversely, the neoclassical or modern model of
contract law has strived to balance the conflicting values of individual autonomy with public concerns through a "flexible and pragmatic" methodology. 2 36 This methodology allows the judiciary to
give weight to "social factors, public policy, and community standards of morality." 2 37 Under classical contract law, the belief is that
parties express every important term in their contracts. 238 Conversely, neoclassical or "[m]odern contract law assumes and often
expects parties not to incorporate expressly into the agreement
2' 3 9
every understanding and expectation."
Critics of the neoclassical model argue that allowing courts to
analyze several outside factors not expressly found in the contract
231. See Davis, supra note 228, at 1128-29 (advancing idea that sports represent "microcosm of [American] society"). The fundamental values of American society are not only reflected through the institution of sports, but the sports
world also helps to shape these values. See id. (highlighting interplay between
sports and society); see also D. STANLEY EITZEN & GEORGE H. SAGE, SOCIOLOGY OF
NORTH AMERICAN SPORT 17, 55, 182-85 (5th ed. Wm.C. Brown Co. 1993) (detailing interplay of sports and society).
232. See Kellye Y. Testy, An Unlikely Resurrection, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 219, 228
(1995) ("Contract, as does law in general, reflects the value system of the culture in
which the legal system is embedded. The tensions and ambivalence of society are
played out in law.").
233. For a further discussion of the background of the classical model of contract law and the emergence of today's neoclassical model of contract law, see Davis, supra note 228, at 1118-28.
234. See generally Davis, supra note 228, at 1118-21 (discussing classical model
of contract law).
235. Id. at 1121 (promoting individual autonomy in classical model of contract law).
236. See id. at 1123-24 (quoting Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract
Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1286-87 (1990) and discussing neoclassical method
of contract interpretation).

237.
238.
cuses on
239.

Id. at 1123.
See id. at 1124 (suggesting classical method of contract interpretation foparties' agreement).
Id.
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results in a body of law that is unintelligible. 240 Advocates for the
modern contract recognize that the neoclassical system is more
complex, but feel that any hindrance caused by the complexity is
outweighed by the results. 24 1 The neoclassical model of contract
law provides results that balance individual autonomy (in allowing
and valuing the formation of private agreements) while ensuring
some degree of fairness (by looking into outside social factors, public policy and community values).242 Doctrines that have developed
as a result of the neoclassical contract law evolution are: promissory
estoppel, unconscionability, condition precedent, and good faith, to
243
name a few.

Professor Carol M. Rose 244 provides an excellent analogy that
supplements the above discussion in her law review article, Crystals
and Mud in Property.245 Professor Rose recognizes that legal rules
tend to fall along a spectrum and follow a predictable cycle. 246 On

one end of the spectrum are "hard-edged or crystal" rules that are
mechanically applied and involve a few simple facts that attach legal
consequences. 24 7 These crystal rules would be synonymous to the
classical model of contract law. On the other end of the spectrum
are rules that allow outside social factors, desirable to our society, to
apply when interpreting a rule. 248

Rose refers to these as "mud

rules" which are identical to the neoclassical model of contract
law. 249 Legal rules tend to begin as crystal rules and over time

evolve into mud rules; however, if the legal rules become too
240. See id. (identifying criticism of neoclassical method of contract interpretation); see generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 577 (1988) (describing classical model of contract law as body of "crystal
rules," and neoclassical or modern contract law as "mud rules").
241. See Davis, supra note 228, at 1126 (providing counterargument to criticism of neoclassical method of contract law).
242. See id. (suggesting neoclassical method balances individual autonomy
and fairness).
243. See id. (noting genesis of unconscionability doctrine).
244. See Yale Law School - Faculty - Carol M. Rose, http://www.law.yale.edu/
faculty/CRose.htm (last visited May 1, 2008) (providing biographical and professional information).
245. See generally Rose, supra note 240 (analogizing classical and neoclassical
models of contract law to crystal and mud rules in property law).
246. See id. at 580-87 (providing three examples of property rules which
started as crystal rules, moved to mud rules, and reverted back to crystal rules).
247. See id. at 590-93 (discussing advantages of crystal rules).
248. See id. at 593 (describing mud rules).
249. See generally id. (suggesting mud rules take into account fairness and social policy).
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muddy, the rules are likely to slide back toward the crystal end of
2 50
the spectrum.
The suitability of any rule depends on how well it realizes preferred social policy.2 5' The crystal rules, while providing clarity and
certainty in predicting how the law will be applied, may unfairly
expose people to the deceitfulness of others because they know
what the law will permit. 252 Alternatively, mud rules, designed to

protect goodness and altruistic efforts, admittedly involve many factors and it becomes more difficult to interpret definitively how
25 3
these rules will be applied in a court of law.
Professor Rose recognized a similar argument also advanced by
Professor Laurence Tribe, 2 54 discussing how judges make decisions
not only based on the "rational calculations of the actors and people similarly situated to the actors" but also based on an attempt to
mold the society in which we live. 255 Professor Tribe believes that
"decisions ... are constitutive, and it would corrode our moral un-

derstanding of ourselves as a society if we were to permit gross unfairness to reign simply for the sake of retaining clear rules and

rational ex ante planning, particularly if those rules covertly serve
the wealthy and powerful. 2 5 6
B.

Athletic Scholarship Recognized as a Contract

In regard to the NCAA and student-athletes, courts have consistently determined that the athletic scholarship is a contract, and
thus recognize a student-athlete's right to assert a breach of contract action against the college institution. 2 57 The first case holding
250. See generally id. (tracing evolution of rules along crystal to mud
spectrum).
251. See generally id. (outlining contrast between application of crystal rules
and mud rules relative to area of law applied to).
252. See id. at 592 (commenting on weakness of crystal rules).
253. See id. (addressing potential difficulties encountered when applying mud

rules).
254. See Harvard Law School, Faculty Directory, http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/directory/facdir.php?id=74 (last visited May 1, 2008) (providing biographical information of Professor Laurence Tribe).
255. See Rose, supra note 240, at 593 (referencing Tribe's argument regarding
effect of judicial decisions on society); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional
Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. Rv. 592, 592-93 (1985)
(providing rebuttal to Frank Easterbrook's view that fairness is secondary consideration in judicial decisions).
256. Rose, supra note 240, at 593 (summarizing Tribe's criticism of crystal
rules).
257. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[1]t
is held generally in the United States that the 'basic legal relation between a student and a private university or college is contractual in nature. The catalogues,

282

VILLANOVA SPORTS

&

ENT. LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 15: p. 241

that an athletic scholarship is a contract was Taylor v. Wake Forest
University.258 In Taylor, a student receiving an athletic scholarship
was held in breach of his contractual duties owed to the university
when he refused to participate in athletics in order to focus on his
academics. 25 9 Taylor - a football player for Wake Forest - sought,

along with his father, recovery of educational expenses after the
university terminated his athletic scholarship. 260 Taylor claimed
that the Wake Forest coaches breached an oral agreement that Taylor could restrict or eliminate his involvement in athletics in order
to maintain reasonable academic progress. 2 61 After his freshman
football season, Taylor opted out of athletic participation to focus
on his struggling academic performance. 2 62 As a result, the university terminated his athletic scholarship, or Football Grant-in-Aid.2 63
The court held that Taylor accepted a Football Grant-in-Aid that
was "awarded for academic and athletic achievement" and that in
failing to participate in athletics, Taylor had breached his contrac264
tual obligations.
When the university makes identifiable contractual promises to
the student-athlete, it breaches its contractual obligations if it fails
to make a good faith effort to perform those promises. 265 In Ross v.
Creighton, a men's basketball player who promised to attend and
bulletins, circulars, and regulations of the institution made available to the matriculant become a part of the contract."' (quoting Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 101
Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972))). "Indeed, there seems to be 'no dissent'
from this proposition." Id. (quoting Wickstrom v. N. Idaho Coll., 725 P.2d 155,
157 (Idaho 1986)); see also Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1972) (finding student-athlete on athletic scholarship not to be "complying with his contractualobligations") (emphasis added). Commentators also attribute the contractual relationship arising from the National Letter of Intent,
Statement of Financial Aid, and university bulletins and catalogues. See Michael J.
Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent: A Contract by
Any OtherName, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1290 (1989) (identifying documents which
form contract between university and student-athlete).
258. See 191 S.E.2d at 382 (stating holding).
259. See id. (providing background on case).
260. See id. (describing premise of Taylor's suit).
261. See id. (claiming school representatives agreed that "[i]n the event of any
conflict between educational achievement and athletic involvement, participation
in athletic activities could be limited or eliminated to the extent necessary to assure reasonable academic progress.").
262. See id. at 380 (indicating Taylor's grade point average of 1.0 out of 4.0
was below school minimum of 1.35 after freshman year).
263. See id. at 381 (describing procedure followed prior to termination of
scholarship).
264. See id. at 382 (finding in favor of university).
265. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1992)
(describing one possible way universities can breach contractual obligations with
student-athletes).
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play basketball for Creighton University sued the university, alleging the university failed to perform its promises to provide aca267
demic benefits. 266 The Ross court, similar to the Taylor court,
held that a contractual relationship exists between student-athletes
268
and their university.
Yet in order to state a contractual claim against the university,
the student-athlete "must point to an identifiable contractual promise that [the university] failed to honor."2 69 While recognizing the
contractual relationship between student-athletes and their universities, this narrow holding implicitly requires the student-athlete to
bargain for specific contractual terms, a practice simply not allowed
with the NCAA contractual documents pertaining to student-athletes' athletic scholarships. 270 Furthermore, this narrow holding
has the effect of eliminating a student-athlete's capability to assert a
contractual claim based on a failure to perform implied
promises. 271 In fact, application of this holding would allow
coaches and university officials to make countless oral, express
promises that would be unenforceable unless those promises were
272
found in the standard boilerplate NCAA and university forms.
Courts have recognized the National Letter of Intent ("NLI")
and the Statement of Financial Aid as the two main documents that
form a contract between the student-athlete and the university or
college. The courts have also identified other documents, such as
recruitment letters and university bulletins and catalogues, as part
of the contract. 2 73 The NLI is "applicable only to prospective stu266. See id. at 412 (summarizing facts of case).
267. Compare Taylor, 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (finding contractual relationship to
exist between student-athlete and university), with Ross, 957 F.2d 410, 416 (finding
contractual relationship to exist between student-athlete and university).
268. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 416 (stating holding of case).
269. Id. at 417 (noting why plaintiff-student's suit must fail against defendantuniversity).
270. See Davis, supra note 228, at 1144 (discussing Fortay v. University of Miami,
in which court found contractual relationship between student-athlete and university arising from National Letter of Intent ("NLI"), Statement of Financial Aid and
various recruitment letters); see also Cozzillio, supra note 257, at 1290 (suggesting
relationship between student-athlete and university is based on express contract
that consists of NLI, Statements of Financial Aid and university bulletins and
catalogues).
271. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 416-17 ("To state a claim for breach of contract, the
plaintiff must do more than simply allege that the education was not good enough.
Instead, he must point to an identifiable contractual promise that the defendant
failed to honor.").
272. See id. (reading holding to suggest breach of contract of oral promise
would not be proper basis of breach of contract claim under Ross).
273. See id. at 416 (acknowledging other documents also included in contract
between student-athlete and university).
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dent-athletes who will be entering four-year institutions for the first
time as full-time students." 274 This includes high school students
and students attending junior colleges. In order for the NLI to be
valid, the prospective student-athlete must also sign the institution's
Statement of Financial Aid. 275 Both of these contracts will be con-

sidered null and void if the express terms and conditions are not
satisfied. 276 The NLI is only signed one time by the potential student-athlete and only for one school. 27 7 On the other hand, upon
each renewal of the one-year athletic scholarship, the student-athlete is required to sign the Statement of Financial Aid form. 278 In

addition to the terms and conditions found on both of these documents, the language subtly incorporates by reference the require279
ment of compliance with the rules and regulations of the NCAA.

Thus, NCAA rules and regulations are also contractually binding on
274. National Letter of Intent - Text of the National Letter of Intent, http://
www.national-letter.org/guidelines/nli-text.php,
1 (last visited May 1, 2008).
275. See id. at 2 (discussing financial aid offer component).
276. See id. (stating NLI will be null and void if conditions required by financial aid offer are not met).
277. See id. at
8 (identifying two exceptions to one time signing rule of
NLI). While it is generally true that the NLI is only signed one time, there are two
exceptions under provision 8 of the NLI which read as follows:
[8]a. Subsequent signing year. If this NLI is rendered null and void
under Provision 7, I remain free to enroll in any institution of my choice
where I am admissible and shall be permitted to sign another NLI in a
subsequent signing year.
[8]b. Junior College Exception. If I signed a NLI while in high school or
during my first year of full-time enrollment in junior college, I may sign
another NLI in the signing year in which I am scheduled to graduate
from junior college. If I graduate, the second NLI shall be binding on
me; otherwise, the original NLI I signed shall remain valid.
Id.
278. See, e.g., UNIV. OF TULSA DEP'T. OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, FINAN-

ciAL AID AGREEMENT, at conditions 4, 6 (copy on file at Univ. of Tulsa Dep't. of
Intercollegiate Athletics) (outlining required financial aid form) [hereinafter
Tulsa FinancialAid Agreement]. Condition 4 states, "[t] his Tender is not automatically renewed. Your eligibility for a renewal of this Tender is subject to the University of Tulsa's renewal policies at the end of its term and if you are academically
eligible under University, [Conference], and NCAA legislation." Id. at condition 4.
Condition 6 states, "[i]f you wish to accept this Tender, you must return two signed
copies of this Tender to the Department of Athletics by [due date]." Id. at condition 6.
279. See generally National Letter of Intent, supra note 274 (illustrating incorporation of NCAA rules). For an example of an NLI, see, e.g., Tulsa FinancialAid
Agreement, supra note 278. Condition 2 requires compliance with the receipt of
financial aid under NCAA legislation, Condition 4 requires academic eligibility
compliance under NCAA legislation, Acceptance 2 requires compliance with
NCAA amateur rules, Bylaw 12 and financial aid rules, Bylaw 15, and Acceptance 4
requires any modification or cancellation to be in compliance with NCAA legisla-

tion. See generally id.
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both the university officials and the student-athletes. 280 In the context of intercollegiate athletics, there is judicial reluctance to recognize the relevance of any information not expressly contained in
the signed contractual documents. 281 As such, the courts use a
classical model of contract law, mechanically applying the rule to
keep the freedom of contract ideology alive and reinforcing this
model's premise that courts do not make contracts for the parties
involved. 282 While this position should apply to negotiated contracts, it hardly seems fair to apply such a rigid approach to athletic
scholarship contracts, which are non-negotiable standard-form
agreements. 2 83 A refusal to apply the neoclassical model to these
non-negotiable agreements "uses contract[s] as a means of main28 4
taining the powerlessness of student-athletes."
C.

Athletic Scholarships as Unconscionable Contracts
of Adhesion

[I]s there any principle which is more familiar or more
firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-American law
than the basic doctrine that the courts will not permit
themselves to be used as instruments of inequity and injustice? Does any principle in our law have more universal
application than the doctrine that courts will not enforce
transactions in which the relative positions of the parties
are such that one has unconscionably taken advantage of
the necessities of the other? These principles are not for285
eign to the law of contracts.
An adhesion contract is defined as "a standard-form contract
prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position . . . who adheres to the contract with little choice about the
terms." 286 Oftentimes, a standardized form contract can create an
280. See, e.g., National Letter of Intent, supra note 274 (binding both studentathlete and university under NCAA rules).
281. See Davis, supranote 228, at 1141-46 (providing overview of courts' reluctance to imply terms).
282. See id. at 1145 (suggesting courts' unwillingness to imply terms in this
setting represents classical approach to contract law).
283. See id. ("[G]iving primacy to the bargain principle fails to accept the reality that student-athlete/university contracts are not negotiated but constitute standard form agreements").
284. Id.
285. U.S. v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORP., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
286. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 342 (8th ed. 2004) (defining adhesion
contract).
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inequitable situation where one party can "impose terms on another unwitting or even unwilling party." 28 7 Farnsworth discusses
three factors that lead to this unbalanced situation. 2 88 The first factor involves the advantages of time and expert planning by the
party offering the contract. 28 9 The second factor recognizes that
the other party has little or no experience with the contract, or only
a general understanding of its contents. 290 The third factor relates
29 1
to the disparity of bargaining power between the two parties.
Thus, the party drafting the contract has as much time as necessary to create the document with the aid of expert advice, regu292
larly leading to a contract heavily favoring the drafting party.
The other party typically has little time to fully read the contract,
and has less time to completely understand the fine print and com293
plicated clauses commonly contained in these form agreements.
Usually, these contracts are not between parties with equal bargaining power. 29 4 In fact, adhesion contracts regularly deny one party
any bargaining power whatsoever. For example, these adhesion
contracts may be used by an "enterprise with such disproportion29 5
ately strong economic power that it simply dictates the terms."
Another reoccurring form of adhesion contracts is the take-it-orleave-it agreement. In a take-it-or-leave-it contract, the party's "only
296
alternative to complete adherence is outright rejection."
Adhesion contracts will not automatically be considered "unconscionable per se, and all unconscionable contracts are not contracts of adhesion." 29 7 The fact that it is an adhesion contract,
however, will give substantial weight to a claim for unconscionabil287. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 557-58 (3d
ed. 2004).
288. See id. (identifying three factors which suggest adhesion contract).
289. See id. at 558 ("First, the party that proffers the form has had the advantage of time and expert advice in preparing it, almost inevitably producing a form
slanted in its favor.").
290. See id. ("Second, the other party is usually completely or at least relatively
unfamiliar with the form and has scant opportunity to read it-an opportunity
often diminished by the use of fine print and convoluted clauses.").
291. See id. ("Third, bargaining over terms of the form may not be between
equals or, as is more often the case, there may be no possibility of bargaining at
all.").
292. See id. at 558 (expounding on first factor).
293. See id. (expounding on second factor).
294. See id. (expounding on third factor).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 reporters notes, cmt. a
(1981).
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ity due to its standardized nature and the lack of bargaining power
298
it affords the other party.
1.

The Doctrine of Unconscionability
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) not

only "recognizes a doctrine of unconscionability, 299 but has also set
the standard that if a contract is found to be unconscionable, it is
unenforceable as a matter of law. 30 0 In subsection one of section 2302, the U.C.C. provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause or term of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause or term as to
30 1
avoid any unconscionable result.
Thus, this section of the U.C.C. allows courts to "police explicitly
against the contracts or terms which the court finds to be unconscionable." 30 2 Prior to this section, courts dealing with unconscionable contracts had to arrive at the equitable result so desired by "an
adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of
offer and acceptance, or by a determination that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. '30 3 U.C.C. section 2-302 allows "court[s] to pass directly on
the unconscionability of a contract,... and to make a conclusion of
law as to its unconscionability." 30 4 Consequently, Karl Llewellyn referred to this section as "perhaps the most valuable section in the
30 5
entire Code."
298. See id. (commenting on relationship of adhesion contracts to doctrine of
unconscionability); accord U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. I (1998) ("Courts have been particularly vigilant when the contract at issue is set forth in a standard form.").
299. FARNSWORTH, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 577.
300. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1981) ("[L]ike
the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, the policy against unconscionable
contracts or terms applies to a wide variety of types of conduct.").
301. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 208 (1981).
302. U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 1 (1998).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. FARNSWORTH, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 578 (quoting Llewellyn, who has
been "credited with the authorship of U.C.C. § 2-302").
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U.C.C. article 2 only applies to "transactions in goods."30 6 As a
result, section 2-302 is technically only applicable to contracts involving the sale of goods. 30 7 Yet, this section of the U.C.C. has been
persuasive in non-sales cases and has been used by analogy or because of the overriding sense of fairness it represents, outweighing
the statutory limitation applying only to the sale of goods. 30 8 Due
to its wide acceptance in non-sales cases, Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 208 reflects U.C.C. section 2-302, applying the doc30 9
trine of unconscionability to all contracts generally.
The determination of unconscionability is made in "light of
[the contract's] setting, purpose, and effect." 3 10 The court rather
than the jury makes this determination. 3 1 1 When unconscionability
is asserted, the parties must be allowed to present evidence that will
help the court make the final determination.3 12 In addition, the
party raising the claim of unconscionability has the burden of prov3 13
ing it.

Neither the U.C.C. nor the Restatement has provided a specific
definition for unconscionability, but the U.C.C. does provide a basic test to lend some general guidance. 31 4 "The basic test is
whether, in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the term or

306. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1998).
307. See id. (limiting application of U.C.C. Article 2).
308. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 reporters notes, cmt. a
(1981) (expanding reach of U.C.C. 2-302 beyond transactions involving sale of
goods).
309. See Farnsworth, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 579 (noting that in addition to
Section 208 of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, several uniform laws began
to incorporate doctrine of unconscionability).

310.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 208, cmt. a (1981).

311. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 579 (citing U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt.
3 (1998) and explaining court determines unconscionability because of history of
remedy as equitable).
312. See U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1998) ("[Plarties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to
aid the court in making the determination."); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. f (1981) ("[P]arties are to be afforded an opportunity to
present evidence as to commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
its determination.").
313. See Guaranteed Foods of Neb., Inc. v. Rison, 299 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Neb.
1980) (holding that party asserting unconscionability must also plead it).
314. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 581 (acknowledging that unconscionability defies easy definition, but noting that general test for unconscionability is included in comments to UCC § 2-302).
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contract involved is so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
3 15
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract."
2.

Proceduraland Substantive Unconscionability

A majority of the courts today still rely on the two-part test set
forth in Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo. 31 6 That test provides
that "unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party. '3 17 As a result, most cases of unconscionability include, and
frequently require, some combination of the following two categories: (1) procedural unconscionability, which considers whether
there was an absence of meaningful choice for one of the parties,
and (2) substantive unconscionability, which focuses on the actual
contract terms and whether those terms are unreasonably favorable
to the drafting party. 3 18 Furthermore, it is a generally applied and
accepted rule that if more of one of the categories is present, then
31 9
less of the other is required.
Procedural unconscionability focuses on oppression and unfair
surprise. 320 The oppression element considers two factors: whether
315. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt 1 (1998) (emphasis added); see also FARNSWORTH,
supra note 287, § 4.28 at 581 (identifying test for unconscionability).
316. See 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (setting forth two-part test).
317. Id. at 449 (emphasis added) (noting first case to establish unconscionability test). The description of unconscionability established in Williams v. WalkerThomas FurnitureCo. has remained basically unchanged over the decades since the
case was decided. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 582 (suggesting test of
unconscionability in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. remains intact).
318. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir.
2003) ("[U]nder Ohio law, the unconscionability doctrine has two components,
both of which must be present: (1) substantive unconscionability, i.e., unfair and
unreasonable contract terms, and (2) procedural unconscionability, i.e., individualized circumstances surrounding each of the parties to a contract such that no
voluntary meeting of the minds was possible."). See also Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.,
63 P.3d 979, 983-84 (Cal. 2003) ("The doctrine of unconscionability has both a
'procedural' and 'substantive' element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, and the latter on overly harsh or one-sided
results." (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000))).
319. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 585 (identifying case holding
that when contract is more substantively unconscionable, less procedural unconscionability is required) (citing Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 767).
320. See Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (defining unconscionability); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940
(9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he procedural aspect [of unconscionability] is manifested
by[:] (1) 'oppression', which refers to an inequality of bargaining power resulting
in no meaningful choice for the weaker party, or (2) 'surprise', which occurs when
the supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden in a document." (citing A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982))).
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an inequality in bargaining power existed such that no real negotiation occurred between the two parties and whether there was an
absence of meaningful choice for one of the parties.3 21 The unfair
surprise element examines whether the supposedly agreed-upon
terms are hidden or concealed in the document. 3 22 "In many cases
the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of
' 323
bargaining power.

Substantive unconscionability examines the actual contractual
terms to determine if the terms are unreasonably favorable to the
more powerful party.3 24 Factors considered include whether the integrity of the bargaining process is damaged, or if it is contrary to
public policy. 325 Substantively, unconscionable terms may generally

be regarded as unfairly one-sided 26 or as an "overly harsh allocation of risks or costs which is not justified by the circumstances
under which the contract was made."3

27

While unconscionability

normally requires a finding of both procedural and substantive elements, the substantive element "alone may be sufficient to render
the terms of the provision at issue unenforceable, ' 3 28 particularly if
the sum total of the substantive provisions is grossly unfair and
3 29
"drive[s] too hard a bargain."
3.

Application of Unconscionability to Athletic Scholarship Contracts

As previously mentioned, courts have found the NLI and the
Statement of Financial Aid to be the two main contractual documents between the university and the student-athlete. 3 30 NCAA
321. See Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145 (discussing oppression element of procedural unconscionability).
322. See id. at 1532 (outlining unfair surprise element of procedural unconscionability); see also Svalina v. Split Rock Land & Cattle Co., 816 P.2d 878, 882
(Wyo. 1991) (providing list of six factors to aid in identification of procedural
unconscionability, including "was one party in some manner surprised by fine
print or concealed terms").
323. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
324. See 8 RICHARiD A. LoRD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 2004)
(discussing substantive unconscionability).
325. See id. (identifying factors to be considered in substantive unconscionability analysis).
326. See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 1071 (Cal. 2003) (defining
substantive unconscionable terms).
327. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001).
328. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
329. United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 206
(D. Mass. 1998).
330. See Davis, supra note 228, at 1144 (discussing what courts consider to be
contractual documents of athletic scholarship).
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rules and regulations are incorporated by reference in both of
these documents. 33 ' As a result, courts must not only look to the
four corners of the NLI and Statement of Financial Aid, but must
also look at the incorporated NCAA rules and regulations.
A student-athlete asserting a claim of unconscionability bears
the burden of proving both procedural and substantive unconscionability before a court will find the athletic scholarship contract to
be an unconscionable contract of adhesion. 332 The student-athlete
must show: (1) an inequality of bargaining power between the institution granting the athletic scholarship and the student-athlete, (2)
a lack of meaningful choice or alternative for the student-athlete,
(3) supposedly agreed-upon terms hidden or concealed in the con333
tract, and (4) terms that unreasonably favor the institution.
a.

Procedural Unconscionability: Elements of Oppression and
Unfair Surprise

The athletic scholarship contract is oppressive because there is
no meaningful choice for the student-athlete entering into the contractual agreement. In order to receive an athletic scholarship, student-athletes must sign both the NLI and the institution's
Statement of Financial Aid, both of which are standard-form adhesion contracts. 334 While the student-athlete can choose which institution to attend, the contractual documents the student-athlete
33 5
must sign are the same form agreements from school to school.
331. See National Letter of Intent, supra note 274 (incorporating NCAA rules
by reference in National Letter of Intent as well as athletic department's Statement
of Financial Aid).
332. See Guaranteed Foods of Neb., Inc. v. Rison, 299 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Neb.
1980) (holding party asserting unconscionability must also plead it); see also Little
v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 1071-72 (Cal. 2003) ("The doctrine of unconscionability has both a 'procedural' and 'substantive' element, the former focusing
on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, and the latter on

overly harsh or one-sided results." (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare
Servs., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000))).
333. For a further discussion of the elements a student athlete must show if
asserting unconscionability, see supra notes 316-29 and accompanying text (listing
elements of doctrine which must be proven to prevail on unconscionability claim).
334. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 286, at 342 (explaining both NLI
and institution's Statement of Financial Aid are "standard-form contract[s] prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, who adheres to
the contract with little choice about the terms"). In fact, the student-athlete has no
choice about the terms found in the contractual agreement proffered by the
NCAA and its member institutions. See National Letter of Intent, supra note 274
(discussing take-it-or-leave-it approach of university and NCAA documents).
335. See National Letter of Intent, supra note 274 (suggesting no alternative to
NLI exists).
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Thus, the student-athlete is deprived of any meaningful choice and
is compelled to enter into and accept the agreement as stipulated.
The athletic scholarship contract will also be viewed as oppressive by the courts because of the gross inequality of bargaining
power between the two parties. 33 6 For example, gross inequality of
bargaining power may exist when the stronger party (NCAA) has
knowledge that the weaker party (student-athlete) "is unable to protect his interest by... [an] inability to understand the language of
the agreement.

33

7

Stemming from the gross inequality of bargain-

ing power, the student-athlete has no opportunity to negotiate,
change, or delete any of the provisions. This is explicitly set forth
in the NLI. 33 8 Similarly, an institution's Statement of Financial Aid

also has a provision severely limiting the student-athlete's bargaining power, stating that any changes or modifications must be in
compliance with the university, its athletic conference rules, and
NCAA legislation. 3 39 In addition to bargaining power, there is almost always a vast imbalance in knowledge between the two parties
regarding the terms and provisions of the contract, particularly with
3 40
regard to the NCAA rules.

The NLI and the institution's Statement of Financial Aid are
take-it-or-leave-it contracts of adhesion. 34 1 Professor E. Allan Farnsworth appropriately recognized that, when dealing with take-it-orleave-it adhesion contracts, "the only alternative to complete adher336. See Roussalis v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 247 (Wyo. 2000) (listing
factors of procedural unconscionability). The Roussalis court outlined:
"[P]rocedural unconscionability includes: deprivation of meaningful
choice as to whether to enter into the contract, compulsion to accept
terms, opportunity for meaningful negotiation, such gross inequality of
bargaining power that negotiations were not possible, characteristics of
alleged aggrieved party (underprivileged, uneducated, illiterate, easily
taken advantage of), and surprise by fine print or concealed terms."
Id.
337. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998).
338. See National Letter of Intent, supra note 274, at
15, 18 (stating in
paragraph 15, "No additions or deletions may be made to this NLI or the Release
Request Form," and stating in paragraph 18, "My signature on this NLI nullifies
any agreements, oral or otherwise, which would release me from the conditions
stated within this NLI").
339. See, e.g., Tulsa FinancialAid Agreement, supra note 278, at acceptance 4
("Any modification or cancellation of this Tender must be in compliance with University, [Conference] and NCAA legislation.").
340. For a further discussion of the inequality in knowledge between the student-athlete and the university officials in regards to NCAA rules, see infra notes
346-51 and accompanying text.
341. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 286, at 342 (defining adhesion
contract). The NLI and the Statement of Financial Aid fall arguably within definition of adhesion contract.
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ence is outright rejection."' 342 As a result of the NCAA and its member institutions' grossly disproportionate bargaining power, even
the freedom of contract ideology will not prevent the courts from
343
declaring the contract void as against public policy.
Procedural unconscionability also includes an unfair surprise
element where supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden or concealed. 34 4 Both the NLI and the Statement of Financial Aid incorporate NCAA legislation by reference. In so doing, the most
important terms affecting the lives of student-athletes are not just
hidden in these documents, but are completely concealed. The
NCAA manual is a 476-page document containing rules that are
345
often found to be difficult and convoluted.
NCAA member institutions have employees within their athletic departments whose sole purpose is to ensure NCAA compliance. 346 The job of a compliance director involves the difficult task
of attempting to "master the intricacies of NCAA rules. '3 47 Many of
the NCAA rules are either "too abstract to be read literally or must
'348
be interpreted by the NCAA even when they appear to be clear.
Thus, even persons most qualified to handle NCAA rules experi349
ence difficulty.
Accordingly, student-athletes and their guardians are not given
a reasonable opportunity to read and understand the NCAA terms
of the athletic scholarship contract. 3 50 Moreover, even if the NCAA
342.

FARNSWORTH,

supra note 287, at 558.

343. See Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 601 (N.J. 1973) (determining freedom of contract to be non-existent when parties' bargaining power is
grossly disproportionate).
344. For a further discussion of procedural unconscionability, see supra notes
320-23 and accompanying text (outlining factors of procedural unconscionability);
see also Blackistone, supra note 86, at 1B ("There ought be a law against this sort of
thing. Or, at least, the fine print ought to be bolder.... NCAA by-law 15.3.5.1 ...
allows colleges to take away an athletic scholarship for, basically, whatever
reasons.").
345. See generally NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1 (containing 476
pages).
346. See Vahe Gregorian, The NCAA Honor System, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
July 20, 2003, at DI (discussing job of compliance director).
347. Id. (stating NCAA compliance director's job is "inherently thorny, beginning with the call to master the intricacies of the NCAA rules, which are voted
upon and implemented by member institutions").
348. Id. (stating, "in recent years many institutions have turned to attorneys"
to interpret NCAA's rules).
349. See id. (suggesting even NCAA compliance directors have difficulty interpreting NCAA rules).
350. See Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah
1997) ("Procedural unconscionability addresses whether the party had a reasonable opportunity to read and understand the terms of the contract").
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terms were conspicuously placed on the documents to be signed it
is not reasonable to believe that the student-athlete and their par351
ents would understand those terms.
b.

Substantive Unconscionability: Terms Unreasonably Favorable
to NCAA and Member Institutions

The athletic scholarship contract is substantively unconscionable because it is one-sided, overly harsh, and the "sum total of its
contractual terms drives too hard a bargain." 35 2 The NCAA rules

governing amateurism exemplify this notion. NCAA rule 12.01.1
provides that only amateur student-athletes will be eligible for athletic participation. 353 NCAA rule 12.1.2 lays out ways in which one's
amateur status may be lost, including any receipt of payment - directly or indirectly - that can be linked in any way to the studentathlete's athletic skill. 35 4 NCAA rule 12.1.2 even states that amateur

status will be lost if the student-athlete "[a] ccepts a promise of pay
even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics participation. 3 5 5

Searching for a solution to the

problem posed by this Comment, commentators have suggested a
"have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too" approach whereby a trust would be
created, allowing student-athletes the ability to preserve their amateur status while their athletic eligibility remains.3 5 6 The money
generated through the use of the commercial value of their identity
would be placed in a trust until the expiration of their athletic eligibility. If implemented, a trust system would greatly alleviate the
egregious commercial injuries to star student-athletes under the
current substantive provisions of the NCAA Manual. Unfortunately, the trust proposal is unlikely to pass muster under NCAA
rule 12.1.2(b) because it would constitute a promise of pay to be
351. For a further discussion regarding why the NCAA rules are hard to understand, see supra notes 346-50 and accompanying text.
352. United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 206
(D. Mass. 1998); see also State v. Brown, 965 P.2d 1102, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding clause or term will be substantively unconscionable if "one-sided or overly
harsh").
353. See NCAA DFvOsIoN I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.01.1, at 65 (limiting
NCAA eligibility to amateur student-athletes).
354. See id. art. 12.1.2(a), at 66 (providing situations where student-athlete
would lose amateur status).
355. Id. art. 12.1.2(b), at 66.
356. See, e.g., Belo, supra note 4, at 154-56 (offering one solution which would
permit student-athletes to share in royalties generated by using their identity without destroying their amateur status); see also Mueller, supra note 163, at 87-88 (proposing trust to hold money earned by student-athletes until graduation).
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received upon the completion of intercollegiate athletics
participation.

357

Moreover, NCAA rule 12.5.2.1 revokes athletic eligibility if a
student-athlete receives any remuneration for the use of his name
or photograph to be used in connection with any commercial product or service. 358 Two points of interest arise from this rule. First,
NCAA eligibility is revoked under this rule if the student-athlete
simply allows his name or photograph to be used even if the student-athlete receives no money for the use of his name or photograph. Second, a literal reading of the rule causes one to notice
that it only addresses name or photograph. If one views the plain
meaning of this rule as allowing the student-athlete to receive monetary benefit from the use of his identity as a star player, such as with
items featuring the star player's number, think again. Attempting
to squeeze through this potential loophole simply sends you back to
NCAA rule 12.1.2 - providing that any pay, whether direct or indirect, linked to the star player's athletic skill will result in the stu359
dent-athlete losing amateur status.
With respect to EA Sports, and its NCAA March Madness video
game, it also appears that the NCAA licenses other ways to infringe
on the student-athletes' right of publicity. NCAA rule 12.5.1 deals
with permissible promotional activities.3 60 For example, as long as
certain conditions are satisfied, 361 "[i] nstitutional, [c] haritable,
[e]ducation[al], or [n]onprofit [p]romotions . . .may use a student-athlete's name, picture, or appearance .... -362 NCAA rule

12.5.1.1(h), however, states:
Any commercial items with names, likenesses or pictures of
multiple student-athletes... may be sold only at the member
institution at which the student-athlete is enrolled, institutionally controlled (owned and operated) outlets or out357. See NCAA DrvsIoN I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2(b), at 66 (prohibiting student-athlete from accepting compensation even if compensation is received
infuture).
358. See id. art. 12.5.2.1, at 78 (listing impermissible promotional activities for
student-athletes).
359. See id. art. 12.1.2, at 66 (listing seven ways student-athlete can lose amateur status).
360. See id. art. 12.5.1, at 75 (permitting certain institutions and groups to use
student-athlete's name and picture under certain conditions).
361. See id. art. 12.5.1.1(a)-(i), at 75 (listing nine conditions in conjunctive
form). If any of the conditions are not satisfied, the promotional activity is no
longer permissible. See id. (providing conditions that must be met for permissible
promotional use of student-athlete's name, picture, or appearance).
362. Id. art. 12.5.1.1, at 75.
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lets controlled by the charitable or educational
organization .

.

. Items that include an individual stu-

dent-athlete's name, picture, or likeness (e.g. name on
jersey, name or likeness on a bobblehead doll), other than
informational items (e.g. media guide, schedule cards, in363
stitutional publications), may not be sold.
Under a reading of both White and Ali, the virtual likenesses of the
student-athletes depicted in the commercial video games would
constitute a finding that EA Sports - officially licensed by the NCAA
- commercially exploits student-athletes without their consent.
The rules governing amateurism are substantively unfair to the
student-athlete, disregarding the legally accepted right of publicity.
The rules are contrary to the policy of "prevent[ing] the unjust enrichment of others seeking to appropriate that value for themselves." 36 4 Therefore, the sum total of the NCAA provisions
governing amateurism is one-sided, overly harsh, and "drives too
'3 65
hard a bargain.
Consequently, the combination of oppression and unfair surprise directed towards student-athletes leaves no doubt that athletic
scholarship contracts are procedurally unconscionable. Additionally, the terms and provisions of athletic scholarship contracts are
unreasonably favorable to the NCAA and its member institutions,
providing ample evidence as to its substantive unconscionability.
Therefore, athletic scholarship contracts are unconscionable contracts of adhesion.
c.

Remedies
Courts have declined to allow for the recovery of damages in

unconscionability suits.3 66 Yet if courts find unconscionability, they

will have "broad discretion in further proceedings. 3 6 7 The courts
may find the entire contract to be void or they may refuse to en363. Id. art. 12.5.1.1(h), at 75.
364. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995).

365. State v. Brown, 965 P.2d 1102, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (stating
clause or term will be substantively unconscionable if it is "one-sided or overly
harsh"); see also United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192,
206 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting substantive unconscionability will be found if "sum
total of the provisions of a contract drives too hard a bargain").
366. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 595 (citing cases which have
declined to award monetary damages).
367. Bracey v. Monsanto Co., 823 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Mo. 1992) ("[I]t may refuse to enforce contract, it may enforce remainder of contract, free from provisions deemed to be unconscionable, or may limit application of offending clause
in order to avoid unconscionable result.").
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force or limit the application of the term or clause found to be
unconscionable. 368 Consequently, once the court recognizes unconscionability, the provisions under the NCAA rules and regulations that supposedly provided consent by the student-athlete
would be unenforceable. As such, the NCAA would have no defense to the right of publicity claim asserted by the aggrieved student-athlete. Furthermore, upon a finding of unconscionability,
the contradictory nature of the mission of the NCAA can be
presented to further demonstrate the unfairness, allowing the court
to reach an equitable decision "in light of the contract's setting,

purpose, and effect." 369 Courts have even interpreted their author3 70
ity as to allow them to add terms to unconscionable agreements.
In order to make an equitable decision, courts should either refuse
to enforce the unconscionable terms and clauses of the athletic
scholarship contract, or they should add terms to change the unconscionable results.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The NCAA and its licensees should not be allowed to use an
athlete's identity and star persona solely for their financial gain.
This results in a windfall, or unjust enrichment, without any compensation to the athlete who is responsible for creating this finan-

cial gain. But this is exactly what happens with the sale of college
sports merchandise, namely jerseys and other items featuring the
numbers of star-players and video games displaying the virtual likenesses of the student-athlete. This market for collegiate sports merchandise is a multi-billion dollar industry that exploits the
commercial value of star-players' identities without their consent,
and without providing any compensation to these student-athletes.
This practice has been going on for years under the guise of preserving amateurism. Using the identity of an NCAA star-athlete for
368. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 594 (noting two ways in which
courts deal with unconscionable contracts); see also Bracey, 823 S.W.2d at 950 (giving trial court broad discretion in further proceedings if contract is found to be
unconscionable).
369. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1998). "[P]arties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to
aid the court in making the determination." Id. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. f (1981) ("[P]arties are to be afforded an opportunity to
present evidence as to commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
its determination.").
370. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 287, § 4.28 at 595 (referencing case where
court added term to unconscionable contract (citing Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv.
Assn, 415 A.2d 1156 (N.J. 1980))).
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commercial advantage is not appropriate - it is appropriation - and

it violates the student-athlete's right of publicity. Until the NCAA
makes major changes to its current system, many student-athletes
have actionable right of publicity claims against the NCAA and its
licensees.

